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STATEMENT REGARDING FACTS1
Space constraints preclude the Jensens from pointing out the many areas of dispute
in the appellees' fact statements. Ironically, at the same time that the appellees are
arguing that the federal court's ruling resolved all facts necessary for the lower court to
rule on the Jensens' state law claims, they simultaneously ask this Court to consider
portions of the record not cited in the federal court's ruling. See, e.g., Wagner/Albritton
Brief, p. 7 n.2 (citations in defendants' fact statement designated as other than to FC-R
are "added" facts from the record). That is what the Jensens asked the trial court to do review the record, and apply it to the Jensens' state law claims.
Nonetheless, a few examples illustrate the existence of fact disputes even under
the appellees' own record citations:
A critical issue in this case is whether the Jensens were trying to get confirmation
of the diagnosis (as they say), or insisting on experimental treatment (as the appellees
say). This is crucial because even the appellees do not argue that, under the state
constitution, a child can be taken removed from parents who are following the
recommendations of a licensed physician to seek reasonable confirmatory testing.
Accordingly, the only way appellees can argue that their actions were narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest is by claiming that the Jensens were not questioning
the diagnosis when Wagner reported them to DCFS. Thus, Wagner/Albritton's brief
says:

1

For brievity, the Jensens refer to appellees Wagner and Albritton as "Wagner/Albritton,"
and Anderson, Cunningham, and Eisenman as "the DCFS Defendants."
1

At the [June 9, 2003] meeting, the Jensens never mentioned genetic testing; they
raised no questions about it. (FC-R. 96-97.) The subject never came up, because the
Jensens were not questioning the diagnosis - only the treatment - as they were
opposed to conventional chemotherapy treatment. Id. [Wagner/Albritton Brief at
19.]
The only record cite offered for this "undisputed" fact was testimony of appellee
Wagner's supervisor, Dr. Lemons, that Wagner never told him that the family had requested
molecular or genetic testing. In other words, Wagner/Albritton's sole citation for the
proposition that the Jensens were not questioning the diagnosis was Wagner's failure to tell
others that they were questioning the diagnosis - one of the very omissions upon which the
Jensens base their claim.
Not only is this assertion unsupported, but it ignores rather overwhelming evidence
to the contrary. For example: Wagner does not dispute that the Jensens requested a second
opinion from Dana-Farber because they wanted to confirm the diagnosis. {See Appellants'
Brief at 8.) Wagaer/Albritton acknowledged below that, on June 9, the Jensens asked about
the language of the pathology test, and "[t]he Jensens suggested that because the tumor did
not appear in the bone, as Ewing's sarcoma usually does, then it may not be Ewing's
sarcoma." (R. 404,2365.) The Jensens asked at this meeting for another sample of Parker's
tissue to be tested, and were refused. Barbara Jensen stated that "PCMC keeps jumping to
treatment," and Daren Jensen said, "We are doing A, B, C, and he was doing A and then Z."
(R. 2161,2435; see also 2411-12, 2422-23; Brief of Appellants, pp. 11, 13.)
Another pivotal event in this case involved DCFS liaison David Corwin's attempt
to schedule a meeting between him, Wagner, the Jensens, and the Jensens' doctor who
was questioning the diagnosis. This meeting would have afforded an opportunity for the
2

Jensens to explain to a neutral party their request for confirmatory testing, which Wagner
implied to Corwin had already been done. The Jensens and Corwin agreed to meet, but
Wagner refused and instead reported the Jensens to DCFS, misrepresenting - repeatedly
- that it was the Jensens who refused to meet. (See Brief of Appellants, pp. 12-13, 74.)
This obviously cannot be considered "narrowly tailored" conduct under the state
constitution; hence, appellees recharacterize it more favorably to themselves:
Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attempted to schedule a further meeting to
discuss the situation. (FC-R. 122.) [R. 515 (Ex. 29, pp. 103-105, 111-112, 119-121;
Ex. 31; Ex. 4, pp. 231-232).] At that point, the decision was made to refer PJ's case
to DCFS to medical neglect in refusing what the doctors believed was medically
necessary treatment. (FC-R. 122-123.) Id. [Wagner/AlbrittonBriefat2L]
Appellees assert numerous other examples of "undisputed" facts that are quite
obviously disputed. For example: They move up the date when the lump was first
noticed (because the much earlier date is inconsistent with a fast-growing cancer) (R.
1132, 3283, 2332-34); claim that it had grown and changed color (not true, see R. 233334); state that Ewing's "may" be diagnosed through cytogenetic / molecular testing that
"often" reveals an 11 ;22 translocation, when all witnesses agreed that such testing is the
gold standard for diagnosing Ewing's, and an 11;22 is found in 95 percent of Ewing's
patients (see Appellants' Brief, pp. 5, 15; R. 392, 515 (Ex. 62, p.2), 1271 (p. 17), 2668,
3205, 3360; Wagner/Albritton Brief, p. 10); state that the Burzynski Clinic had no
experience with pediatric Ewing's Sarcoma, when it is undisputed that it did treat the
synonymous "PNET outside the central nervous system" and "soft tissue sarcoma" (R.
3134-35); state that the clinic only did FDA clinical trials, when that was only one
department within the clinic (R. 3125, 3631-38); claim that the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial
3

did not influence Wagner's actions when Wagner himself testified that he refused genetic
testing because it was not required by the Clinical Trial (R. 3180; see also 3164-65, 3196;
Appellants' Brief, pp. 5, 15); state that Wagner had no motivation to make
misrepresentations after the Clinical Trial enrollment deadline passed, when there was
evidence that the deadline he was using did not pass until June 20, and Wagner had already
gone public with his allegations by that point and could not simply say, "Nevermind." (R.
3378, 3386; see Appellants' Brief, p. 6.)
Wagner/Albritton further state:
Dr. Coffin's diagnostic method and analysis met the standard of care, according to
Dr. Christopher D. M. Fletcher, a world expert in diagnosing soft tissue sarcomas.
[R. 515 (Ex. 21; Ex. 22, pp. 19,95, 127).] [Wagner/Albritton Brief at 12.]
This testimony is, again, characterized in the manner most favorable to Wagner and
Albritton. Dr. Fletcher (their expert witness) actually admitted that what the pathologists
did was the least that could be done and still meet the minimum standard of care. (R. 207374). More fundamentally, this statement disregards the testimony of every medical witness
below (except Wagner) that, regardless of whether Wagner personally felt that genetic
testing was necessary, it was appropriate and reasonable for the Jensens to seek such testing
for their child. (E.g., R. 1500-02, 1759-60, 3360.)
Another important factor in the Jensens' state constitutional claims is that Wagner
reported the Jensens after being informed that they were going to seek out another hospital
to obtain the requested diagnostic testing. Because that would be inconsistent with
appellees' claim that the Jensens were simply refusing treatment, their brief states: "The
Jensens left the meeting, telling the PCMC representatives, "You're fired." (FC-R. 122) [R.
4

515 (Ex. 1, p. 181).] and leaves out the immediately preceding key words. Quoted in full,
the Jensens said, "We're going to go find another hospital that will work with us. You're
fired." (R. 2412 (emphasis added).)
Another key aspect of the Jensens' state constitutional claims is that appellees
Eisenman and Cunningham did not tell the juvenile court that L. A. Children's genetic test
results were not yet back when they obtained custody of Parker. This is important because,
as the juvenile court had stated, those results were to be controlling of Parker's care. To
avoid the consequence of this fact, appellees state:
On July 18, 2003, Dr. Tishler was told by CHLA pathologist, Dr. Gonzales, that he
had diagnosed PJ's tissue as Ewing's sarcoma, and that the final results of his
analysis would follow in a few days. [R. 515 (Ex. 41, pp. 43-44; Ex. 44, p. 2).]....
Per the [July 10, 2003] stipulation, the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where PJ
met with Dr. Tishler on July 21,2003. (FC-R. 125) [R. 515 (Ex. 41, p. 25).] Dr.
Tishler told the Jensens that based on the pathology tests done at LabCorp, PCMC
and University of Washington and from what he was told by Dr. Gonzales, that:
"The results are likely nonequivocal and indicate the presence of a high grade
malignant lesion." [R. 515 (Ex. 43, p. 10).] [Wagner/Albritton Brief, pp. 25-26J
Tishler actually testified that, while the date on the (immunohistochemical)
pathology report pre-dated the Jensen meeting, he had not seen the report when he met with
the Jensens, and everything he said to the Jensens on May 21 was based on the outside
facility's information. He further said that, even if he had received preliminary information
about PJ's tissue, he would never have mentioned incomplete or unfinished testing to the
Jensens. Tishler reiterated in court on July 28, 2003, that genetic testing was not complete,

2

This was factual knowledge by Eisenman, because she was the last to have
communication with Tishler, and knew that he had not reported any test results.
5

and stated in his deposition that he might never have seen the pathology report. (R. 308889,3165-67.)
Wagner/Albritton further state:
[B]ased on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the juvenile court ordered that PJ commence
chemotherapy before August 8, 2003, without regard to the CHLA test results. (FCR. 126.) [R. 515 (Ex. 10, pp. 237-240).] [Wagner/Albritton Brief at 27J
To the contrary, Dr. Tishler stated repeatedly that he would not be making any final
recommendations until after his test results were in, and the juvenile court scheduled the
anticipated start date for chemotherapy only after receiving an estimate of when those
results would be back. (R. 515 (Ex. 33c, pp. 23-24, 60, 62, 63-66), 3562, 3703.) The
juvenile court also ruled that the Jensens would be given an evidentiary hearing on August
20 "in the event PJ.'s situation was not yet resolved." (Wagner/Albritton Brief at 29,
citing (FC-R. 127) [R. 515 (Ex. 10, pp. 238-239)].)3
Perhaps most typical of the appellees' approach to the facts is Wagner/Albritton5 s
attempt to explain the inconvenient fact that Parker Jensen is alive and well seven years
after he was supposed to be dead within "two weeks." Parker has a "90% chance or greater
of eventually developing metastatic disease," they say, and "will more than likely eventually
die from Ewing's sarcoma." (Wagner/Albritton Brief, p. 40) But the only record citation is
to their expert's testimony regarding general statistics; he expressly testified that he could
not render any opinion as to Parker's prognosis because he lacked sufficient information.
The Guardian ad Litem's notes were that the juvenile court ruled that LACH's test
results were to be "determinative." (R. 3481-83, 3620.) Presumably, considering that no
minutes or order were available until after the Jensens had been accused of violating the
order, it was reasonable for the Jensens to interpret the judge's oral ruling the same way
as the GAL.
6

(R. 515 (Ex. 19, pp. 112-117).) Appellees also ignore the October 8, 2003, testimony of Dr.
Johnston in Boise, who was personally involved in PJ's case, that "if [Parker] could get to
the point where he was about three years out from the beginning of treatment.. .at that point,
if the tumor has not come back, it almost certainly will not come back." (R. 3575.)
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLEES HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF
ESTABLISHING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF RES
JUDICATA.

Appellees' briefs have not rectified any of the fatal flaws in the trial court's ruling.
First, although the DCFS Defendants cite a few cases in which intermediate state courts
appear to use res judicata language regarding issues in a single case (and some that do
not)4, application of the doctrine in this case is governed by Tenth Circuit law, under
which res judicata is inapplicable to claims or issues in a single case. Mcllravy v. KerrMcGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031, 1034 n.l (10th Cir. 2000) ("Res judicata does not
speak to direct attacks in the same case, but rather has application in subsequent
actions.") Appellees do not challenge that law. Indeed, Wagner/Albritton conceded as
much at the hearing below. See R. 4220 (Transcript) at 6, Reply Add.Exh. 2 ("The
plaintiffs have pointed out, and I think technically correctly, that res judicata, technically,
may not apply within the same case.")5

4

See, e.g., Vines v. Univ. of Louisiana at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2005) (multiple
actions).

5

Wagner/Albritton argue that one vs. two cases is a "distinction without a difference."
The Tenth Circuit apparently feels otherwise. Moreover, the only case cited by
7

On appeal, both sets of appellees urge that the federal court's ruling imposed a
"mandate" that the state court must follow as "law of the case." (Wagner/Albritton brief
at 56-57; DCFS Defendants' brief at 31.) Although this argument would not affect the
outcome, see infra, the Jensens note that it was not preserved below. None of the
defendants mentioned law of the case in their summary judgment motions or supporting
memoranda. (R. 281, 947, 1012, 1076, 1030, 1083, 1086, 1089.)
When Wagner/Albritton belatedly attempted to raise law of the case for the first
time in their reply memorandum (R. 4190), the Jensens objected. The Jensens' counsel
noted that, had law of the case been raised, they would have briefed the matter
differently. {See R. 4220 (Transcript) at 42, Reply Add.Exh. 2.) For example, counsel
stated, the Jensens would have argued that law of the case would be discretionary as to
the state claims, see, e.g., Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 216 P.3d 352,
2009 UT 43, K 12 ("While a case remains pending before the district court prior to any
appeal, the parties are bound by the court's prior decision, but the court remains free to
reconsider that decision. It may do so sua sponte or at the suggestion of one of the
parties"); Farr v. Hughes, 2009 UT App 161 (mem. dec.)("It is true that 'under the law of
the case doctrine, a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in
successive stages of the same litigation.' However, even after granting summary
judgment, 'the [trial] court remains free to reconsider that decision.'") (citations omitted).

Wagner/Albritton, Oman v. Davis SchoolDist., 2008 UT 70, 194 P.3d 956, involved a
plaintiff who brought a state action after losing in federal court - i.e., two cases.
8

Additionally, the Jensens' counsel noted that, if law of the case were at issue, they
would have argued that the defendants were precluded from rearguing adverse legal
rulings issued by the federal court, such as Judge Cassell's legal determination that the
Spackman elements are satisfied in this case {see Reply Add.Exh. 1 at 28-31), and that
the Jensens' three remaining state constitutional claims are cognizable independent of the
Jensens' federal claims. See R. 4220 (Transcript) at 43, Reply Add.Exh. 2; id. ("had they
argued law of the case, we would have said great, that just saved us 20 pages of arguing
the history of the State Constitution"). The trial court confined its ruling to the
defendants' arguments on res judicata. (R. 4206.)
Frankly, reframing their argument does not help appellees in any event, because
the only "mandate" offered by the federal court regarding the state constitutional claims
is that they "present important questions of state law" that should be decided by the state
court - hardly an indicator that the state court should consider its hands tied.
More important, the appellees continue to go about this whole process backwards.
Although the Jensens have extensively explained why state constitutional protections are
broader than the federal, that is not actually their obligation. Federal law (which governs
application ofres judicata to federal rulings) is quite clear: Whether they are arguing
claim or issue preclusion, it is the defendants' burden to prove that the issues or claims
are identical, not the plaintiffs burden to prove that they are not. See Brief of
Appellants, pp. 63, 66; Valley View Angus Ranch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Field Services,
Inc., 497 F.3d 1096, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007)(reversing grant of summary judgment where
the "(defendant] has failed to bear its burden to affirmatively prove the defense of issue
9

preclusion"); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1093 (10th Cir.
2003)(defendants have the burden of establishing issue preclusion, including identity of
issues).
In the trial court and on appeal, the Jensens explained at length how the evidence
would support a violation of specific state constitutional provisions. Appellees have not
done the converse, analyzing what issues would be pertinent to (let alone dispositive of)
these same provisions.6
Thus, for example, appellee Anderson suggests that the federal court's finding that
he did not act with "deliberate indifference" precludes one or more of the Jensens' state
claims. How? Is deliberate indifference a threshold requirement on any of the Jensens'
state constitutional claims? Anderson makes no attempt to show that it is.
Regarding his alleged material omissions, Anderson cites a statement by the
federal court that "Plaintiffs did 'not direct[] the Court to evidence that Mr. Anderson
knew the Juvenile Court was unaware of the possibility of genetic testing or that genetic
tests were 'definitive,'" and "Plaintiffs had adduced no evidence that Anderson
understood" that a stipulation had been violated," etc. Again, this misapprehends the
parties' burdens. In state court, Anderson is required to affirmatively demonstrate the
absence of a fact issue. "[U]nless the moving party meets its initial burden to present
evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, 'the party opposing the
motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"
6

Similarly, the appellees did not provide to the lower court any analysis of the elements
of the Jensens' common law claims, and whether or how issues decided by the federal
court would have any bearing on them.
10

Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600 (unlike federal law, Utah law does not allow
a summary judgment movant to merely allege a lack of evidence in the nonmoving
party's case, but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence
establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact) (citations omitted)).
Appellee Cunningham's argument is equally noncompliant with applicable
standards when seeking summary judgment based upon res judicata. For example,
Cunningham cites a factfinding by the federal court that any misrepresentations she made
were not "deliberate" - an assessment of a party's mental state that would be improper
under state law - but would that dispose of the Jensens' claims against her? The Jensens
have argued that recklessness is sufficient for a state constitutional claim - reckless
actions are by definition not "narrowly tailored" - and the federal court made no findings
regarding recklessness. Cunningham does not address any of these issues.
Like all of the other defendants (and the trial court), Cunningham simply assumes
that whatever barred the Jensens' federal constitutional claims against her automatically
bars their state constitutional claims, even though this Court has stated that the federal
constitution sets the floor, not the ceiling, of constitutional protections for Utahns. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, % 17, 108 P.3d 701. Assumptions do not
even come close to meeting a defendant's burden of proving that issues or claims are
identical, as required to prevail on an affirmative defense of res judicata.
Appellee Eisenman similarly fails to make any attempt to show that the scope and
effect of the issues are identical in the Jensens' federal and state claims. (She does make
an alternative de novo argument for immunity under state law, which is addressed infra?)
11

Instead, Eisenman recites certain rulings by the federal court and then simply says, in
effect, "These rulings must dispose of the state claims, too," with no further analysis.
Wagner and Albritton's positions are even less clear. What issues are dispositive
of the state constitutional claims against them, and why? They do not say. Can judgment
on the state constitutional claims be sustained solely on the federal court's ruling, or must
the trial court also review Wagner/Albritton's additional record citations? They do not
say. (If it is the latter, then the ruling was erroneous on its face, as the trial court
admittedly conducted no review of the record at all, let alone of the Jensens' competing
citations.)
In short, the appellees' arguments do not address, let alone satisfy as a matter of
law, any of the applicable standards - (1) the federal res judicata requirement of
affirmatively proving that the issues/claims are identical; (2) this Court's requirement that
a defendant affirmatively demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment, rather than
baldly stating that the plaintiff cannot prove their case, Orvis, supra; or (3) the primacy
approach to state constitutional analysis, in which the state constitution is reviewed
independently, and federal law is no more controlling than law from sister states. See
Brief of Appellants, pp. 37-39, 42-43.7

7

To illustrate the error in the appellees (and the trial court's approach), assume that a
plaintiff has a federal statutory claim, and state breach of contract, negligence, and
negligent misrepresentation claims. The federal court issues certain factual rulings
dispositive of the federal statutory claim, and then remands the state claims. No
defendant would argue that it satisfies his burden of proof on res judicata to file a motion
that said, "The trial court issued this ruling. It disposes of the plaintiffs' breach of
contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation claims," without analyzing the
12

In the absence of any effort by the defendants to prove which issues would be
dispositive of which state constitutional claim(s), or why, the trial court was left with a
generic contention that all of the Jensens' state constitutional claims are identical to all of
their federal claims, and therefore all of the issues must automatically be the same. And
that is essentially what the trial court ruled:
[T]he issues in this case arise from a single, distinct set of events and as
demonstrated by the Memorandum Decision of Judge Stewart, the factual
contentions that underlie the Plaintiffs' state law claims against the Defendants
have been conclusively decided. This said, Judge Stewart's legal conclusions bar
Plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Constitution because there is no historical or
textual basis for interpreting Utah's Constitutional provisions in this case
differently from the Federal Constitution. Moreover, no Utah appellate decision
supports interpreting the Utah Constitution to provide broader or different rights in
this case.
*

*

*

In sum, the facts, the alleged harm, and the analysis of plaintiffs' state law claims
are the same as those already considered and dismissed by Judge Stewart and,
there being no additional or different rights provided by the Utah Constitution,
dismissal is appropriate in this forum as well.
R. 4203 (emphases added).
On appeal, Wagner/Albritton urge this Court to adopt a similar blanket approach,
stating:
As established below, there is no material difference between these rights under
the U. S. Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Since the rights and claims are
identical so are the underlying factual and legal issues.

elements of each claim and why the federal court's ruling disposed of them as well. Yet
that is what appellees have done with respect to the Jensens' state constitutional claims.
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(Wagner/Albritton Brief at 45 (emphasis added).) But that improperly shifts the burden
on Wagner/Albritton's affirmative defense to the Jensens.
The appellees do state in passing that the Jensens' state and federal claims are
identical. However, their principal support for this assertion is not affirmative analysis,
but merely a complaint that the Jensens have not cited Utah cases involving similar facts
(as if these facts could ever be duplicated). It is a reality that many litigants - including
the appellees - do not independently brief state constitutional claims, and this Court has
never imposed the Catch-22 requirement of a factually similar Utah case finding greater
protection before the Court can find greater protection. As in all areas of the law, parties
and courts extrapolate from existing precedent (including some "antiquated" cases, as the
DCFS Defendants put it, which reflects how long these principles have been recognized).
Moreover, other than dismissing it as an "irrelevant discourse of Utah history," the
appellees do not challenge the Jensens' analysis of the motives, backgrounds,
experiences, wording choices, and authority influential to the state constitution's
Framers, nor their case law from other jurisdictions and commentary, all of which
considerations this Court has endorsed when addressing the scope of state constitutional
protections (and other legal issues, for that matter).
Nor do the appellees contest the principles elucidated in the Utah cases that are
cited by the Jensens, or explain why the broader protections afforded to such activities as

8

On appeal, the DCFS Defendants acknowledge that the Jensens' state and federal claims
are not identical (DCFS Defendants' Brief, p. 31), which in itself demonstrates error in
the trial court's analysis.
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board of pardons proceedings or the conducting of a business would be denied to the far
greater fundamental right of caring for one's child. In short, the Jensens' analysis of the
breadth of the Utah Constitution's protections is essentially unchallenged. The appellees'
few arguments regarding specific constitutional provisions are addressed here:
A.

Inherent / inalienable rights, Art. I, § 1.

Wagner/Albritton argue that claims involving familial association / direction of
medical care should be limited to Art. I, § 7 (due process), because in an earlier case
involving a court proceeding, this Court addressed the issue under § 7. Of course, not all
of the defendants' actions were confined to the juvenile court proceeding itself. In any
event, the same conduct often creates potential liability under more than one theory (e.g.,
bad faith and fraud). As long as double recovery is avoided, the plaintiff may present
both causes to the jury.
B.

Due Process, Art. I, § 7.

Appellees state that Utah and federal due process rights are the same, but offer no
explanation why, other than mentioning that this Court has sometimes found them to be
the same, and sometimes found them not to be. (Wagner/Albritton Brief, pp. 61-62.)
The Jensens' analysis of why they are in fact different in this case is unchallenged.
Elsewhere in their brief, Wagner/Albritton argue that "[t]he Jensens' core
contention that the government cannot dictate a child's medical treatment is misguided."
(Wagner/Albritton Brief at 41.) According to Wagner/Albritton, the sole issue is that
"[the Jensens] believe that it was their decision alone to either not treat P.J. or treat him
with Insulin Potentiation Therapy, whose efficacy and safety had not been proven." Id.
15

"[T]he juvenile court has the power and duty to order that a child be treated with standard
curative therapy to save his life/5 they argue. Id at 42.
Apart from the fact these contentions are unsupported by analysis or authority,
they do not aid the appellees because they have nothing to do with the Jensens' actual
claims: that the Jensens had a state constitutional right to follow the recommendation of
a licensed physician that they seek readily available, reliable diagnostic testing without
being reported to DCFS for doing so, and without having appellees force them to choose
one physician over another or take custody of their child based upon material
misrepresentations and omissions.9
C

Art I, § 14.

Wagner/Albritton argue that the Jensens' rights under Art. I, § 14 are the same as
the Fourth Amendment, because one of the cases cited by the Jensens, State v. Bean, 869
P.2d 984 (Utah 1994), "is a seizure case, so it does not apply here because the Jensens
were never physically seized." (Wagner/Albritton Brief at 62.) Apart from the fact that
this is just another "We disagree" argument rather than affirmative analysis, the Jensens
were seized (Daren was arrested, and he and Barbara were both booked into jail).
Moreover, Wagner/Albritton ignore entirely the Jensens' arguments as to why the
9

Wagner/Albritton say that their point in this case is "prove[d]" by the asserted fact that
the child at issue in a 1979 case cited by the Jensens later died from Hodgkin's disease.
Of course, it is unknown whether the state-requested treatment would have made any
difference to that outcome. (If the defendants had succeeded in forcing unneeded
chemotherapy on Parker Jensen, undoubtedly they would now be claiming that they
"cured" him.) However, if Wagner/Albritton contend that the correctness of the parties'
position is proved by the outcome, the fact that Parker is in Chile serving a mission seven
years after he was supposed to be dead would seem to refute their own argument.
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restraints to which they were subjected would unquestionably be considered a seizure
under the Utah Constitution. See Brief of Appellants, pp. 60-62.
The DCFS Defendants argue that there is nothing in Utah's history that would
support greater rights under § 14 than under the Fourth Amendment. More specifically,
they argue that the polygamy prosecutions are irrelevant, citing Paul G. Cassell, "Search
and Seizure and the Utah Constitution, The Irrelevance of the Antipolygamy Raids,"
1995 B.Y.U.L.REV. 1. Ironically, appellees previously cited this same article to its
author, (then) Judge Cassell, who disagreed with their interpretation, ruling that the
Jensens' § 14 claim is independently cognizable. See Reply Add.Exh. 1 at 38-41.10
Apart from the foregoing, the Jensens argued alternatively in their opening brief
that, even if issue or claim preclusion might otherwise apply, policy considerations would
not support its application here. That argument is particularly compelling in the unique
procedural posture of this case: (1) Fully briefed state constitutional claims, (2) involving
fundamental rights, (3) originally brought in state court and included in the case from its
inception, (4) have already been ruled by the federal court to be separately cognizable
from the federal claims, and (5) the federal court went out of its way not simply to
decline jurisdiction, but to emphasize that it was doing so because the Jensens' "Utah
constitutional claims present important questions of state law[.]" If ever a case called for
the non-application of res judicata, this is it.
10

The DCFS Defendants do not mention the reasoning behind Prof. Cassell's argument in
the article, which was that the polygamy prosecutions would not have affected the
Framers' general attitudes toward crime. Such rationale - that Utah's Framers would not
have been pro-criminal - obviously would not apply to innocent parents and children.
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Wagner/Albritton argue that issue preclusion would "prevent[] inconsistent
outcomes based on the same events/' and the federal court has reviewed the evidence
"and found nothing to indicate that the doctors violated the Jensens' rights." But that
argument only has force if the "rights" are identical under the state and federal
constitutions; otherwise, there is nothing inconsistent about allowing the Jensens to
recover for violations of one and not the other11.
n.

APPELLEES HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED AN ALTERNATIVE
BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE UNDER SPACEMAN.

Appellees seek affirmance on the alternate ground that plaintiffs have not met the
requirements for a damages claim under the state constitution outlined in Spackman v.
Bd. Of Ed Of Box Elder County Sck Dist, 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533. (In federal court,
Judge Cassell ruled that, for three of the four state constitutional claims, Spackman is
satisfied (see Reply Add.Exh. 1, pp. 28-31). The defendants did not appeal that ruling, or
Judge Cassell's ruling that Art. I, §§ 1, 7, and 14 are self-executing.)
Under Spackman, a plaintiff seeking damages for violation of the state constitution
must prove that (1) the constitutional violation was "flagrant"; (2) that "existing
remedies" do not redress his injuries; and 3) that equitable relief is inadequate to protect
the plaintiffs rights or redress his or her injuries.

11

Wagner/Albritton also suggest that the Jensens' claims are barred by the juvenile court
action. (Wagner/Albritton Brief at 42.) They say that "comparative fitness" was
"litigated before the juvenile court," but provide no support for, or analysis of, that
contention. If Wagner/Albritton mean to suggest that the juvenile court proceeding
somehow has res judicata effect, that legal argument was rejected by Judge Cassell, see
Reply Add.Exh. 1, pp. 31-33.
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A.

Flagrancy of Constitutional Violations of Article I, §§ 1 & 7.

In essence, [flagrancy] means that a defendant must have violated "clearly
established" constitutional rights "of which a reasonable person would
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73
L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To be considered clearly established, "[t]he contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)
(citations omitted).
Spackrnan, supra at f 23.
Wagner and Albritton imply that Judge Stewart found that the law was not clearly
established, Wagner/Albritton Brief at 65, but as they acknowledge elsewhere, "the court
did not reach the qualified immunity question as to whether the violated right was clearly
established." Id. at 54. In fact, both Judge Stewart and Judge Cassell recognized that the
alleged constitutional rights are clearly established, under both federal and state law. See,
e.g., Reply Add.Exh. 1 at 30 ("The alleged violations of these sections appear to be
"flagrant"); 37 ("There is no compelling state interest in falsifying or misrepresenting
evidence to a juvenile court."), and 42 ("multiple factual misrepresentations...omission[s]
or falsehoods would undoubtedly affect the fairness of the proceedings."); see also Brief
of Appellants Add.Exh. 3 at 32 ("...the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care ...is not
only fundamental, but is also clearly established").
It has long been established that Article I, §§ 1 and 7 of the Utah Constitution
guarantee both procedural and substantive due process rights, including the fundamental
rights attendant in the parent-child relationship. Wells v. Children's AidSoc. of Utah, 681
P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) (Art. I § 7 recognizes
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and protect "the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or
her child"); Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904) (defining right of
"liberty" encompassed in Art. I § 1 as "a term of comprehensive scope[] ... embracing]
not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person,
but also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights").)
The requirement that a DCFS caseworker do at least some investigation of neglect
allegations - statutorily recognized as a component of due process - was likewise clear in
2003. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-409(l) & (2) (2003); § 62A-4a-202.3(2)(a)-(g) (2003).
DCFS' primary purpose is to protect children from abuse and neglect, Utah Code Ann. §
62A-4a-201(2), but it can only do so by using "the least intrusive means available," §
62A-4a-201(3), and in undertaking those least intrusive means, it must protect Utah
parents' "fundamental right and duty to exercise primary control over the care,
supervision, upbringing, and education of their children." § 62A-4a-201(l)(b) (2003).
Appellees do not dispute that these rights are fundamental; hence, governmental
actors have long been on notice that interference with the parent-child relationship is
presumptively unconstitutional unless they can prove that their actions were "narrowly
tailored" to serve a "compelling state interest." Wells, 681 P.2d at 206-07. It goes

12

While the federal court held that the claimed "emergency" barred a federal
constitutional claim (even though Cunningham said she never investigated any medical
neglect reports), this excuse would not bar a state constitutional violation, as evidenced
by the Framers' unique and intense concerns about forced separation of the family, which
appellees have not refuted. E.g., Brief of Appellants, pp. 54-55. Moreover, even in an
emergency, Cunningham was still required to "meet with the parents, attempt to negotiate
voluntary compliance with medical treatment pending or in lieu of court involvement,
and assess and document the parents' reasons for refusal to treat." (R. 3431.)
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without saying that the State has a compelling state interest in protecting the health and
well-being of children. See In re J.P., supra. However, it also goes without saying that
there can never be a compelling state interest in falsifying or misrepresenting evidence, of
which there is evidence that all defendants did, or reporting parents to DCFS for seeking
reasonable diagnostic testing. See, e.g., Reply Add.Exh.l, p. 37. Nor can such
misconduct be considered narrowly tailored.
The Jensens' entitlement to a procedurally sound involvement with DCFS and the
juvenile court is also clearly established under Art. I, § 7. Wells, supra at 204 (§ 7
guarantees "notice and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order to have
a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property." "The general test for the validity
of such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness.") (citations omitted). It
cannot be argued that making material misrepresentations and omissions affords a fair
process. See also Brief of Appellants, p. 50 and Reply Add. Exh. 1 at 42.
B.

Existing Remedies / Equitable Relief.

The appellees do not argue that any federal remedies exist that would be adequate,
or (as they argued in the trial court) that sufficient remedies are available through the
Jensens' state common law claims. Appellees argue, however, that the Jensens could
have appealed from the juvenile court. Appealed what? The final order of dismissal in
their favor? The July 10 stipulation allowing them to seek independent testing, upon
which the Jensens were relying? The July 28 oral ruling, for which minutes were not
even available until August 11, after custody had already been transferred?
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In any event, Wagner and Albritton's argument misapprehends the Jensens'
claims, which do not seek reversal of the interlocutory or final juvenile court order, but
rather damages for the defendants' constitutional violations. Utah juvenile courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction whose "powers are limited to those specifically conferred by
the statute." In re B.B., 2004 UT 39, ^ 19, 94 P.3d 252. None of its codified areas of
jurisdiction would have allowed the juvenile court to entertain civil claims for money
damages based upon violations of state and federal constitutional rights or state common
law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104 (2003)(setting forth jurisdiction of juvenile court).
Wagner/Albritton argue that "the Jensens have failed to establish that equitable
relief- such as an injunction, restraining order, or a motion to dismiss the removal
proceeding - was wholly inadequate to protect their alleged right to direct Parker's
medical care regardless of Parker's best interest." (Wagner/Albritton Brief at 68.)
Ignoring the final clause (the Jensens wish that the appellees would show the courtesy of
at least acknowledging the Jensens' actual argument), the appellees do not explain how
one of those methods would have compelled them to stop making misrepresentations, or
reimbursed Daren Jensen for his lost wages, or paid the Jensens' legal bills, or removed
the handcuffs from Daren's wrists.
The violation of constitutional rights cannot always be effectively remedied by
injunctive relief. See Spachnan, 2000 UT 87, f 25. id, citing Bott ("if prisoners' rights
under article I, section 9 are violated, injunctive relief may not be adequate to remedy
prisoners' injuries") citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and Rockhouse
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Mountain Property Owners Ass yn, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.H.
1986). In this case, there is no equitable relief that would make the Jensens whole.
III.

APPELLEES HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED ANY OTHER
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMANCE OF THE
JUDGMENT.

The appellees briefly argue that, if the judgment cannot be sustained on res
judicata, the Court should affirm on alternative grounds. It must be kept in mind that
these arguments, by definition, hinge upon a review of the record, not the federal court's
ruling. (Otherwise, the appellees would essentially be arguing, "If res judicata does not
apply, please rule for us on these alternative grounds using res judicata.")
A.

Governmental immunity.

The appellees first assert the alternative grounds of governmental immunity,
another affirmative defense. Initially, appellees have not made a showing that
governmental immunity would even apply to claims based upon self-executing state
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Heughs Land, L.L.C v. Holladay City, 2005 UT App
202, Tfl[ 8-9, 113 P.3d 1024, and cases cited (governmental immunity is not a defense to
claims under self-executing provision; "legislative power itself must be exercised within
the framework of the constitution. Accordingly, it has been so long established and
universally recognized, as to be hardly necessary to state, that if a statutory enactment
contravenes any provision of the constitution, the latter governs") (citations omitted).)
Second, appellees base this contention on an assertion that "[t]he federal court
ruled that Dr. Wagner did not act with fraud or malice and did not lie under oath."
(Wagner/Albritton Brief at 64.) (Actually, the federal court did not say that. The
23

appellees made no argument regarding governmental immunity to Judge Stewart.) In any
event, if res judicata does not apply - hence the request for affirmance on an alternative
ground - then it is obviously improper for appellees to rely on a res judicata-dependent
argument as the sole support for this defense.
If the Court entertains this alternative ground, its resolution requires review of the
record - not only the additional cites offered by Wagner/Albritton, of course, but also the
Jensens' conflicting citations, from which a jury could find that each of the appellees
committed fraud and/or perjury. Moreover, that the defendants acted with malice may be
inferred from their statements and from the very fact that they recklessly or intentionally
made material misrepresentations. See, e.g., Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self Sys., 11 Utah 2d
133, 135, 355 P.2d 714 (1960) (malice may be implied from the wrongful act of filing a
criminal complaint without reasonable justification for doing so).
B.

Judicial immunity.

Eisenman seeks affirmance on the alternative ground that she is absolutely
immunity for all of her actions in this case. In support of this contention, Eisenman relies
primarily on statements by the federal court, which is obviously inappropriate when
affirmance is sought on grounds not dependent upon res judicata.
Eisenman has not established the absence of a question of fact on this affirmative
defense. Utah recognizes judicial immunity for judicial officers and those individuals
who perform "functions closely related to the judicial process." Sanders v. Leavitt, 2001
UT 78, f 19, 37 P.3d 1052. "Whether a person or entity should be afforded judicial
immunity depends upon the specific work or function performed," Bailey v. Utah State
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Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993), which is a fact-specific inquiry. Although
judicial immunity extends to acts closely related to the judicial process, it does not extend
to administrative or investigatory functions, Cline v. State Div. of Child and Family
Services, 2005 UT App 498, f 40, 142 P.3d 127, or to wrongful misrepresentations and
material factual omissions, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125
L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). A fact issue exists as to each of these issues.13
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set for above and in the Jensens' opening brief, the Jensens
respectfully request the Court reverse the trial court's judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / C r » day of February, 2010.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Roger P. Christofhsen
Karra J. Porter
Sarah E. Spencer
Attorneys for Appellants

13

Eisenman says that the Jensens' brief did not make any arguments regarding her (and
therefore, apparently, cannot respond to her request for affirmance on an alternate
ground.) SeeDCFS Defendants' Brief at 69. This argument is perplexing. The trial
court's erroneous application of res judicata was the sole basis for dismissing all
defendants. Accordingly, a reversal of that ruling necessarily includes Eisenman. The
Jensens also specifically delineated each of Eisenman's alleged misrepresentations and
other challenged actions, and then articulated for each section of the state constitution
which- type(s) of conduct they believed violated that provision. In any event, appellants
are not required to anticipate in their opening briefs arguments for affirmance on alternate
grounds that a defendant might choose to make; appellants are entitled to argue, as the
Jensens did, that the trial court's actual ruling is erroneous.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

P.J., a minor, by and through his parents and
natural guardians, BARBARA and DAREN
JENSEN; BARBARA JENSEN, individually;
and DAREN JENSEN, individually,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

vs.
STATE OF UTAH; INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, INC.; KARI
CUNNINGHAM, in her individual capacity;
RICHARD ANDERSON, in his individual
and official capacities; LARS M. WAGNER,
in his individual capacity; DAVTD L.
CORWIN, in his individual capacity;
CHERYL M. COFFIN, in her individual
capacity; KAREN H. ALBRnTON, in her
individual capacity; SUSAN EISENMAN, in
her individual capacity; and JANE AND
JOHN DOE, in their individual capacities,

Case No. 2:05CV00739 PGC

Defendants.

A months-long ordeal between plaintiffs Daren and Barbara Jensen and the State of Utah
over medical care for P.J., the Jensens' minor son, began in 2003 when doctors at Primary
Children's Medical Center diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's sarcoma. The Jensens asked for
confirmatory tests, which were not immediately performed. The disputed diagnosis triggered an
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neglect investigation by the State's Division of Child and Family Services because the Jensens
refused to require P.J. to submit to chemotherapy. It also led to a juvenile court proceeding in
which the Jensens lost legal custody of P. J. to the State. The case garnered widespread media
interest, bringing the Jensens unwanted notoriety. Mr. and Mrs. Jensen eventually were indicted
for kidnapping their own son.
After months of wrangling, DCFS decided it could not force P.J. to submit to
chemotherapy without parental support and moved the juvenile court to dismiss the case. The
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office also dismissed the kidnapping charges against the Jensens in
exchange for their plea in abeyance to a lesser misdemeanor charge of custodial interference.
The Jensens then filed this civil rights action, seeking damages for alleged violations of
the United States and Utah Constitutions, for wrongful initiation of criminal charges, and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The crux of the Jensens' allegations is that DCFS
employees, doctors, and attorneys in the Utah Attorney General's office maliciously mislead
Utah courts in their efforts to force P.J. to submit to chemotherapy. They also allege that the
juvenile court proceeds were conducted unfairly due to numerous misrepresentations and that the
defendants' conduct led to unwarranted criminal proceedings against Mr. and Mrs. Jensen.
Before the court are motions by the Jensens to certify a question to the Utah Supreme
Court and by the defendants to dismiss the Jensens' claims. The court denies the Jensens'
motion to certify; at this early stage, the court cannot confidently conclude that all the
requirements in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are met. With respect to the
motion to dismiss, the court is required to assume the truth of the Jensens' allegations.

-2-
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Proceeding on the basis, and as more fully discussed below, the court grants the defendants'
motion in these particulars: (1) all claims against the State of Utah fail because of sovereign
immunity; (2) the Jensens' fourth and eighth causes of action fail to state a claim and must be
dismissed as against all defendants; (3) the Jensens fail to state a claim against Richard Anderson
in his official capacity; (4) plaintiff P.J. fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution or for
denial of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in refusing medical care; and (5) all claims
against Dr. Corwin and Dr. Coffin are dismissed because these two doctors are entitled to
absolute immunity. The court denies the defendants' motions in all other respects.
I.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "only if it appears beyond a doubt that
the plaintiff[s] [are] unable to prove any set of facts entitling [them] to relief under [their] theory
of recovery."1 The court does not determine whether defendants actually did what the plaintiffs
say they did — the law requires the court to "'accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as
distinguished from conclusory allegations,'" in the Jensens' complaint.2 The court also "must
view all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and the pleadings must be liberally
construed" in the plaintiffs' favor.3

l

Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).

2

Beedle v. Wilson, All F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Maker v. Durango
Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998)).
3

i?w/z,299F.3datll81.
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These legal rules do not mean that if a court denies the motions to dismiss and thereby
allows the lawsuit to continue that the defendants are automatically liable and that the plaintiffs
will certainly win. "The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint is not whether the
plaintiffs] will prevail, but whether the plaintiff[s] [are] entitled to offer evidence to support
[their] claims."4 Thus, when resolving this type of motion, the court's job is essentially to ask: If
everything the plaintiffs allege is true, do those allegations establish an injury that the law
redresses? If the answer is yes, the case continues, allowing the plaintiffs to gather evidence that
proves to a jury, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, that the allegations in their complaint
are true.
II.

The State of Utah's Motion to Dismiss

The Jensens named the State of Utah as a defendant in their fifth through tenth causes of
action. Plaintiffs' fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims seek damages for violations of various
provisions of the Utah Constitution. Their ninth and tenth claims seek tort damages. For the
reasons explained more fully below, the court GRANTS the State's motion to dismiss these
claims.
A.

Violations of the Utah Constitution

The State argues that sovereign immunity bars the Jensens' Utah constitutional claims
against it. The court agrees.
In Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Board of Education, the Utah Supreme Court said that,
except for one provision not applicable here, "the Utah Constitution does not expressly provide

"Id
-4-
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damages remedies for constitutional violations."5 Similarly, under Utah law, "there is no express
statutory right to damages for one who suffers a constitutional tort."6 Accordingly, "a Utah
court's ability to award damages for [a] violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
rests on the common law."7
At common law, the State was immune from suit. The Utah Supreme Court has said that
"[s]overeign immunity was as a settled feature of the common law when Utah became a state and
adopted its constitution."8 The Utah Supreme Court defined the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity in these terms: "'[I]n the absence of either express constitutional or statutory
authority an action against a sovereign state cannot be maintained. The doctrine is elementary
and of universal application, and so far as we are aware there is not a single authority to the
contrary.'"9
In this case, the Jensens have not pointed to "express constitutional or statutory authority"
that waives Utah's sovereign immunity and permits claims against the State for violations of the
specific Utah constitutional provisions cited in their complaint. The State's common law
sovereign immunity thus bars the Jensens' constitutional claims against it.

5

16 P.3d 533, 537 (Utah 2000).

"Id.
'Id. at 538.
*Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 504 (Utah 1996).
9

Id (quoting Wilkinson v. State, 134 P. 626, 630 (Utah 1913)).
-5-
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Tort Claims

Though the State has retained sovereign immunity for constitutional violations, the Utah
Legislature has waived the State's immunity for certain tort claims. The Utah Governmental
Immunity Act allows claims against the State "for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment."10 The UGIA, however,
waives immunity only for negligent, not for intentional, torts. The limits of this waiver are fatal
to the Jensens' two tort causes of action — intentional infliction of emotional distress and
wrongful initiation of process — because both are intentional torts.11 As such, the UGIA does
not waive the State's immunity for these two causes of action.
And even if these two causes of action could be classified as stemming from a State
actor's negligence, the UGIA reinstates sovereign immunity in the circumstances alleged here. If
a plaintiffs injury is "proximately caused by a negligent a c t . . . of an employee" but "arises out
of, in connection with, or results from:... malicious prosecution,... abuse of process,... [or]
infliction of mental anguish," that injury cannot form the basis for state liability.12 Since the
Jensens' two tort causes of action arise out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and
infliction of mental anguish, the UGIA bars these claims against the State.

10

&>eUtah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2003).

11

See Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 535 (Utah 2002) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 367 n.12 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (wrongful initiation of proceedings).
l2

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2).
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In sum, the court grants the State's motion and dismisses under Rule 12(b)(6) all of the
Jensens' claims against it. The State has not waived sovereign immunity for its employees'
intentional torts or their violations of the Utah Constitution.
III.

State Employees' Motion to Dismiss

Defendants Richard Anderson, Susan Eisenman, and Kari Cunningham were all
employees of the State of Utah when the events relevant to this lawsuit occurred. Mr. Anderson
was DCFS's director. Ms. Eisenman was an assistant attorney general in the State's Attorney
General's Office. Ms. Cunningham was a DCFS social worker. The court will address each
argument these three defendants make in their motion, beginning with arguments applicable only
to Anderson and Eisenman and then discussing arguments common to all three.
A.

Defendant Richard Anderson

The Jensens sued Mr. Anderson in both his official and individual capacities. He argues
that the court should dismiss the individual capacity claims because the Jensens have failed to
plead a causal link between his conduct and any constitutional violations as § 1983 requires. He
also argues that the official capacity claims should be dismissed because, in his official capacity,
he is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983. The court holds that the individual capacity claims
should not be dismissed but that the official capacity claims should be.
1.

Individual Capacity

Mr. Anderson argues that the Jensens' § 1983 claims against him in his individual
capacity should be dismissed because the Jensens failed to allege an "affirmative link" between
his conduct and any constitutional violation. Mr. Anderson is correct that the Jensens may not

-7-
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hold him liable merely because DCFS employees he supervises may have violated the Jensens'
constitutional rights: "under § 1983, 'a defendant may not be held liable under a theory of
respondeat superior.'"13 "Instead, '[the Jensens] must show that an affirmative link exists
between the [constitutional] deprivation and either [Mr. Anderson's] personal participation, his
exercise of control or discretion, or his failure to supervise.'"14
The complaint sufficiently Mr. Anderson's personal involvement in this case by alleging
that he flew to Idaho on September 15,2003, to negotiate with the Jensens and that he supported
a September 5 stipulation between the Jensens and DCFS to have P.J. evaluated by an Idaho
physician. The Jensens also allege that while in Idaho, Mr. Anderson said to Mr. Jensen, "We
can tell that you're not a neglectful parent, but we just can't let you go."15
As noted above, Rule 12(b)(6) requires the court to accept these factual allegations as
true.16 The court also "must view all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and the
pleadings must be liberally construed."17 The court may grant Mr. Anderson's motion "only if it
appears beyond a doubt that" the Jensens are "unable to prove any set of facts entitling [them] to
relief under [their] theory of recovery."18 These legal standards compel the court to deny Mr.
l3

Ledbetterv. CityofTopeka,3lSF3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Worrellv.
Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000)).
u

Id (citing Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1214).

15
16

Compl.tl57.

i?w/z,299F.3datll81.

ll

Id.

ls

Id. (emphases added).
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Anderson's motion to dismiss. The Jensens' complaint adequately alleges an affirmative link
"between the [constitutional] deprivation and either . . . [Mr. Anderson's] exercise of control or
discretion^ or his failure to supervise.'"19 The complaint alleges that Mr. Anderson's office had
intensive, day-to-day involvement in the Jensens' case during 2003. A reasonable inference from
the entire complaint — not just from the allegations that specifically mention Mr. Anderson — is
that Mr. Anderson, as DCFS's director, personally participated in, exercised control or discretion
over, or failed to supervise his employees' actions in the Jensens' case.
Of course, allowing the claims against Mr. Anderson in his individual capacity to proceed
does not mean that the Jensens will prevail. The Jensens have much more to prove before their
claims against Mr. Anderson in his individual capacity could survive summary judgment, for at
the summary judgment stage, unlike here, the issue is in fact "whether the plaintiff[s] will
prevail," not just whether they have alleged that they will.20 At this stage, however, the Jensens
may proceed with their claims.
2.

Official Capacity

Mr. Anderson also seeks dismissal of all claims against him in his official capacity. His
motion is based on the Tenth Circuit's holding that "[n]either the state, nor a governmental entity
that is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor a state official who acts in his
or her official capacity, is a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983."21 In addition to this Tenth

l9

Id. (citing Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1214).

2l

Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905-06 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
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Circuit holding, the Supreme Court has held that "a suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.
As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself."22
The Jensens concede that their § 1983 claims against Mr. Anderson in his official
capacity should be dismissed based on Harris v. Champion}3 They contend, however, that the
remainder of their claims against Mr. Anderson (state constitutional violations and tort claims)
"are cognizable in both capacities."24 This position fails to account for the Supreme Court's
holding in Will v. Michican Department of State Police that claims against a state officer such as
Mr. Anderson in his official capacity — regardless of the type of claim — are "no different" than
claims against the State itself.25 The court therefore holds that the Jensens' tort and state
constitutional claims against Mr. Anderson in his official capacity fail for the same reasons those
claims fail as against the State of Utah.
The Jensens fail to state a claim against Mr. Anderson in his official capacity upon which
relief may be granted. The court therefore dismisses all such claims against him.
B.

Susan Eisenman

Ms. Eisenman, sued in her individual capacity only, argues that she is entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity from all the Jensens' claims. Absolute prosecutorial immunity extends
22

Will v. Mich. Dep 't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (citation omitted).

23

Pls.' Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss of Defs. Cunningham and Eisenman (Docket
No. 36), Jensen v. Utah, Case No. 2:05-CV-739 PGC (D. Utah filed Jan. 17, 2006).
24

25

DocketNo.36,atlO.

491 U.S. at 70-71.
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to prosecutors when they "perform[] the traditional functions of an advocate."26 But immunity
does not extend to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an
administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.'"27 For example, in Kalina v.
Fletcher, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity when
she provided affidavit testimony in support of a criminal information and arrest warrant.28 The
Court said that immunity did not attach because the prosecutor "performed an act that any
competent witness may have performed."29 Thus, whether Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute
immunity depends on whether the complaint alleges that her actions were prosecutorial or
investigatory.
The Jensens' memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss identifies three specific
instances of investigatory conduct alleged in their complaint. First, they allege that Ms.
Eisenman contacted Dr. Jeorg Birkmayer, an Austrian physician whom the Jensens had contacted
to treat their son. Paragraph 104 of their complaint alleges that Ms. Eisenman e-mailed Dr.
Birkmayer and asked, "As I am sure you are aware, the American Academy of Pediatrics has
established a standard of care for pediatric cancer patients. Is there a similar standard of care for
patients in Australia?" Second, the Jensens allege that Ms. Eisenman was a complaining witness
in the juvenile court. Citing paragraphs 127 and 150 of their complaint, the Jensens claim that

26

Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997).

11

Id. at 125 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)).

2

*See id. at 128-30.

29

Id at 129-30.
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Ms. Eisenman made specific factual misrepresentations to the juvenile court regarding their
alleged disobedience to the court's orders and their son's chance of survival without
chemotherapy. Third, the Jensens allege in paragraphs 141 through 143 of their complaint that
Ms. Eisenman was a complaining witness when she went to Salt Lake County and provided
information that led to kidnapping charges against Mr. and Mrs. Jensen.
In response to the Jensens' allegations that she was a complaining witness, Ms. Eisenman
claims that she made all her statements to the juvenile court in her role as an advocate and not as
a complaining witness. Her counsel also states that:
To the extent any residual claims remain concerning the criminal [kidnapping]
case against Barbara Jensen or Daren Jensen, without allegations that Ms.
Eisenman was the affiant in support of their arrest warrant, a complaining witness
referenced therein, or a prosecuting attorney, there is simply no affirmative link
between her actions and any constitutional violation. Moreover, Plaintiffs could
not make those allegations because Ms. Eisenman was not the affiant and is not to
be found anywhere in either the Information or the Probable Cause Statement for
Barbara Jensen or for Daren Jensen (attached as Exhibits 1 and 2).30
The court reviewed Exhibits 1 and 2, the criminal informations charging Mr. and Mrs.
Jensen with kidnapping. This statement appears on the second page of each exhibit: "THIS
INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES: T. Peterson, K. Cunningham, M. McDonald, S. Eisenman, P.J., and B.
Nakamura."31

30

Docket No. 46, at 9-10 (emphasis added).

3l

See id. Ex. 1 & 2, at 2 (emphasis added).
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Her counsel conceded at oral argument that "S. Eisenman" was defendant Susan
Eisenman but disputed the nature and extent of her involvement. Yet the question remains: did
Susan Eisenman provide factual information to the District Attorney's office that led to criminal
charges against Mr. and Mrs. Jensen? These exhibits create a question of fact about whether she
did. Since the court must view all inferences in the Jensens' favor, these exhibits are sufficient to
defeat Ms. Eisenman's claim to absolute prosecutorial immunity at this time. The plaintiffs,
however, may proceed only as to the limited matters allegedly performed outside Eisenman's
prosecutorial capacity. The court understands that such subjects would be relatively narrow.
C.

P.J. 's Individual Claims

The State employees next claim that P.J. lacks standing to bring his § 1983 claims
because he cannot show "an invasion of a legally protected interest."32 The Supreme Court has
made clear that this requirement is a necessary predicate for Article HI jurisdiction to exist.33 But
recent Tenth Circuit authority shows that defendants' arguments confuse standing with the merits
of P.J.'s claims. The court will discuss this authority before addressing the employees'
arguments.
In Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Walker, the Tenth Circuit addressed a First
Amendment challenge to a Utah Constitution amendment governing wildlife initiatives.34 The
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the amendment. The circuit
32

Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993).
33

See id. (citing Lw/Vw v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

34

No. 02-4105,2006 WL 1377028, at *1 (10th Or. May 17, 2006).
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rejected that argument, stating that "[f]or purposes of standing, the question cannot be whether
the Constitution, properly interpreted, extends protection to the plaintiffs asserted right or
interest. If that were the test, every losing claim would be dismissed for want of standing."35
Thus, "where the plaintiff presents a nonfrivolous legal challenge, alleging an injury to a
protected right such as free speech, the federal courts may not dismiss for lack of standing on the
theory that the underlying interest is not legally protected."36
Here, P.J. alleges injuries to rights he claims are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State employees' motion to dismiss turns on whether "the Constitution, properly interpreted,
extends protection to [P.J.'s] asserted right or interest." If the court dismisses P.J.'s claims, it is
because the Constitution does not protect the rights P.J. asserts — a quintessential merits
question. Walker thus prohibits the court from dismissing P.J.'s claims for lack of standing.
Instead, the court will construe the motion as one to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
1.

Does P.J. Have a Substantive Due Process Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment?

The State employees attack P.J.'s first cause of action, labeled "Liberty interest / Due
Process," which alleges that P.J. "had a clearly established fundamental right and liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to

Id. at *8.
'Id. at *9.
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refuse unwanted medical treatment."37 They argue that "P.J. could not refuse to consent to
medical treatment; he consequently lacked a liberty interest in directing his own medical care."38
This is a troubling proposition. Taken to its logical conclusion, accepting the defendants'
argument would mean that all children, by virtue of their minority, would be incapable of
refusing to consent to medical care and therefore would never, under any circumstances, have a
constitutionally protected interest in refusing medical treatment. This would be a broad
conclusion indeed.
The defendants do not cite any case that holds that minors lack a Fourteenth Amendment
right to refuse medical treatment. On the other hand, the cases the Jensens cite strongly imply
(but do not hold) that a minor may have a liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. For
instance, the Jensens cite Parham v. J.R., where Supreme Court held that a mentally challenged
minor child had a liberty interest in "not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment."39
A later case, however, clarified that Parham "certainly did not intimate that such a minor child,
after commitment, would have a liberty interest in refusing treatment."40 Ultimately, Parham is
not dispositive because it discussed liberty interests of minor children with mental health
problems and was limited to unnecessary confinement, not unwanted treatment. Here, plaintiff

37

38

Compl.1[l89.

Doc. 24, at 7.

39

442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).

40

Cruzan v. Missouri Dep 't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
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P.J. does not have a diagnosed mental illness and he refused treatment rather than
institutionalization.
P.J. also cites Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court
said that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."41 The Court,
citing Parham, also that "[s]till other cases support the recognition of a general liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment."42 And later in its decision, the Court said, "[i]t cannot be disputed
that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing lifesustaining medical treatment."43 Again, these cases — while instructive — are not dispositive
because, with the exception of Parham, all involved adults rather than minors.
The Jensens also cite Tenth Circuit precedent to show that P.J. has a liberty interest to
refuse unwanted medical care. In Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., parents brought § 1983 claims for
physical examinations of their children that allegedly violated the children's "right to refuse
medical treatment."44 While the Tenth Circuit said that "[i]t is not implausible to think that the
right[] invoked here — the right to refuse a medical exam . . . — fall[s] within this sphere of
protected liberty,"45 it declined to resolve the issue and instead relied on the children's Fourth

41

497U.S.at278.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 281.

^336 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Or. 2003).
45

Id. at 1203.
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Amendment rights to resolve their claims.46 Dubbs is also inapposite because P.J., unlike the
minors in Dubbs, was never searched or required to undergo treatment.
Based on these cases, the court holds that a child as young as P.J. did not have his own
right to refuse medical treatment. Instead, that right belongs to his parents. In other words, PJ.'s
claim is subsumed by his parents' claim, at least under clearly established law. The court
therefore grants the motion to dismiss the Jensens' first cause of action as to P.J.
2.

Familial Association

The State employee defendants next incorrectly claim that minor children have no
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in familial association. In 1997, the Tenth Circuit
decided J.B. v. Washington County.41 The two plaintiffs in that case were a mother and her
minor child who sued under § 1983 for alleged violations of their substantive due process right to
familial association.48 The Tenth Circuit said that "[plaintiffs' right to familial association is
included in the substantive due process right of freedom of intimate association, which is
'consonant with the right of privacy.'"49 The court also said that "[u]ndeniably, plaintiffs have a
substantial interest in the right to associate with their family."50 The repeated use of the plural
"plaintiffs," referring both to the mother and her minor daughter, shows that the right to familial

"See id
47

127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997).

48

&e/J.at927.

A9

Id. (quoting Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993)).

50

Id
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association did not belong to the mother only. On this basis, the court holds that minor children
have liberty interests in familial association that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants' argument as to this point fails.
3.

Malicious Prosecution

Finally, the defendants ask the court to dismiss P.J.'s third cause of action, labeled
"Fourth Amendment / Malicious prosecution." The court holds that P.J. fails to state a malicious
prosecution claim and therefore grants defendants' motion.
In Taylor v. Meacham, the Tenth Circuit said that it "takes the common law elements of
malicious prosecution as the 'starting point' for the analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim, but always reaches the ultimate question, which it must, of whether the plaintiff has
proven a constitutional violation."51 "[I]n the § 1983 malicious prosecution context, that
constitutional right is the Fourth Amendment's right to befreefromunreasonable seizures."52
Here, P. J. fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution because his allegations do not
establish each of that claim's four common law elements, which are : "(1) A criminal proceeding
instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in
favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; (4) 'malice,' or a primary
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice."53 Since P.J. does not allege that the
defendants instituted criminal proceedings against him, this claim fails.

51

82 F.3d 1556,1561 (10th Cir. 1996).

52

Id.

53

Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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And even if the court were to construe this claim as alleging a denial of P.J.'s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures — without malicious prosecution
overtones — the claims still fails. Of the "seizures" alleged, those applicable to P.J. are: (1) he
was unable to travel freely, and (2) he was required to be physically present in court or at other
specified locations on numerous occasions.54 Accepting these facts as true, these events do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. They are more properly addressed as violations of P.J. 's
liberty interests, wrongs for which he seeks redress in his other causes of action.
D.

The Jensens State a Claim for Deprivation of Familial Association Rights.

The State employee defendants next argue that the Jensens' familial association claim
fails because the defendants' actions were not unduly burdensome or, alternatively, because the
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The court disagrees with both assertions.
The Jensens' "familial right of association is properly based on concept of liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment."55 The Tenth Circuit has held that "[t]o determine whether a person's
familial association rights have been violated" requires " c a balancing [of] liberty interests against
the relevant state interests.'"56 The question when weighing these interests is whether the State's
conduct "constituted an undue burden on" the plaintiffs' associational rights.57 And "'[n]ot every
statement or act that results in an interference with the rights of intimate association is

54

See Comply 199.

55

Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993).

56

Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).

57

Id.
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actionable.' The conduct or statement must be directed 'at the intimate relationship with
knowledge that the statements or conduct will adversely affect that relationship.'"58
On one side of the scale in this balancing test is the Jensens' "right to associate with
[their] family," which "is a very substantial right."59 This right includes — but is not limited to
— parents' right to direct their child's medical care. The Supreme Court has frequently
"recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children,"60 for "'[fjamily relationships by their nature, involve deep attachments
and commitments to the necessary few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctly personal aspects of one's
life.'"61
Opposite the Jensens' interests sits the State's "'traditional and transcendent interest' in
protecting children from abuse and from situations where abuse might occur."62 Precedent
clearly shows that "the state itself has a compelling interest in the health, education and welfare
of children."63

5S

J.B., 127 F.3d at 927 (quoting Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548 (citation omitted)).

59

Gn#m, 983 F.2d at 1548.

60

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing cases).

6l

J.B., 127 F.3d at 927 (quoting Arnold v. Bd. ofEduc. ofEscambia County, 880 F.2d
305, 312-13 (11th Cir. 1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
62

Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990)
(quotation marks and citation omitted)).
^Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994).
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This case presents the somewhat unusual situation where the parents' firm opinions about
what treatment was best for their son did not coincide with the State's recommendations.
Accepting the complaint's allegations as true, the Jensens agreed with the State all along that P.J.
might well have cancer but wanted to confirm that it was Ewing's before subjecting him to the
rigorous chemotherapy required to treat that specific cancer. The Jensens allege that the State
refused to perform certain genetic tests that would have confirmed P.J.'s diagnosis of Ewing's.
They also accuse the State defendants of acting in concert to maliciously remove P.J. from his
parents' care and force him — against his will and his parents' wishes — to begin chemotherapy.
And the complaint alleges that in 2003, the State deliberately made specific misrepresentations in
Utah courts that led to the transfer P.J.'s legal custody to the State, eliminated PJ.'s ability to
receive care from doctors of his parents' choice, and led to Mr. Jensen's arrest and criminal
charges against Mr. and Mrs. Jensen.
Despite the State's admittedly compelling interest in the health of its children, the court
holds that, based on the complaint's allegations, the balancing tips in favor of the Jensens. Here,
the parents' attempt to secure a reasonable confirmatory diagnosis was met first by stonewalling
and then by misrepresentations to a court in order to secure the State's preferred treatment, all
done with knowledge that the Jensens would be harmed. To be sure, these allegations are
unproven. The court, however, must accept them as true, and on that basis holds that the familial
association claim survives the defendants' motion to dismiss.
For similar reasons, qualified immunity does not shield the State employees from liability
for allegedly violating the Jensens' familial association rights. "When evaluating a qualified
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immunity defense, after identifying the constitutional right allegedly violated, courts must
determine whether the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at
the time it took place."64 Here, as discussed, the constitutional right is the Fourteenth
Amendment right to familial association and right to direct the care of one's children. These
rights were clearly established when the relevant events occurred during 2003.65 It was also
clearly established in 2003 that the Jensens had the right not to be deprived of these liberty
interests as a result of misrepresentations to state courts by government officials.66 The state
actions alleged in the complaint — intentional factual misrepresentations and omissions to the
state courts — could not have been objectively reasonable in light of this clearly established
law.67 Because the court must accept the complaint's allegations as true, defendants are not
entitled to qualified immunity for this claim at this early stage of the proceedings.
E.

The Jensens State a Procedural Due Process Claim.

The employee defendants next argue that the Jensens cannot state a claim for procedural
due process violations because the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee provides for '"the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"68 The defendants

"Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004).
65

See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (plurality opinion) (citing cases); see also J.B., 127 F.3d at

927.
"Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1297-99.
67

See id.
^Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
554(1965)).
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argue that since the Jensens were afforded ample opportunity to be heard in the state juvenile
proceedings, the procedural due process claims must fail.
The defendants' reading of the Due Process Clause, though accurate, is incomplete. In
addition to promising the right to be heard, "[t]he Due Process Clause also encompasses . . . a
guarantee of fair procedure."69 Thus, the Due Process Clause requires more than notice and a
hearing — the notice and hearing must also be fair. The complaint contains allegations that the
State employees and the doctors intentionally misrepresented or omitted facts in the Jensens'
case, including the status of allegedly confirmatory tests, to the Utah juvenile court.70 Thus, for
purposes of this motion, the complaint adequately alleges a procedural due process violation.
F.

Malicious Prosecution Claim

The State Defendants argue that, since the Jensens pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges
of custodial interference, they cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution. The defendants
assert that the Jensens' plea precludes them from proving a "favorable termination," a required
element of a malicious prosecution claim.71
At this early stage of the proceedings, the court finds the complaint pleads facts that could
potentially support a finding that the Jensens' agreement to plead guilty was coerced through
unfair means. In particular, the Jensens allege that felony charges were filed against them due to
the defendants' intentional misrepresentations to the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office.

69

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).

10

See, e.g., Comply 127.

11

See Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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Since the felony charges carried mandatory jail time, defendants' actions ensured that the Jensens
would have to plead guilty to a lesser misdemeanor offense to avoid that jail time. If these
allegations are correct, the Jensens' plea would not preclude their malicious prosecution action.
G.

Ninth Amendment Claim

The Jensens' fourth cause of action seeks damages under § 1983 for alleged violations of
the Ninth Amendment. The defendants argue that this cause of action fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. The court agrees and dismisses this cause of action.
A number of courts have held that "the Ninth Amendment standing alone does not confer
substantive rights for purposes of pursuing a constitutional claim. Specifically, section 1983
civil rights claims premised on the Ninth Amendment must fail because there are no
constitutional rights secured by that amendment."72 And the Tenth Circuit has never held that a §
1983 action can be maintained solely on the basis of a Ninth Amendment violation. To the
extent plaintiffs seek to vindicate alleged violations of their constitutionally protected familial
association rights, they may properly seek redress under § 1983 based on the Fourteenth
Amendment.

72

Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 718 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also Strandberg v. City ofHelena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986) (same);
Clynch v. Chapman, 285 F. Supp. 2d 213 (D. Conn. 2003) (same); Coleman v. Parra, 163 F.
Supp. 2d 876 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (same); Basile v. Elizabethtown Area Sch. Dist, 61 F. Supp. 2d
392 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same); DeLeon v. Little, 981 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1997) (same);
Williams v. Perry, 960 F. Supp. 534 (D. Conn. 1996) (same); Mann by Parent v. Meachem, 929
F. Supp. 622 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn.
1995) (same); Rini v. Zwirn, 886 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Charles v. Brown, 495 F.
Supp. 862 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (same).
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State Law Claims

As discussed above, the Jensens seek damages for alleged violations of the Utah
Constitution and for state-law torts. The State employee defendants seek dismissal of both sets
of claims. The court will first address the defendants' arguments regarding the Jensens' tort
claims and then their arguments regarding the Jensens' Utah constitutional claims.
1.

Tort Claims Against the State or State Actors

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires a claimant to file a notice of claim with
the proper state agency before suing the State or its employees. The required contents of a notice
of claim are set by statute,73 and a proper notice of claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.74
The State employee defendants argue that the court lacks jurisdiction over the Jensens' tort
claims because their notice of claim fails to comply with the UGIA's provisions in two respects.
First, the defendants argue that the notice of claim does not adequately state the nature of the
claims asserted. Second, they argue that notice of claim fails to allege the individual defendants
acted with fraud or malice. Both assertions are incorrect.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3) states that a "notice of claim shall set forth:... the nature
of the claim asserted."75 Defendants argue that the Jensens' notice of claim sets forth only an
infliction of emotional distress claim, so the remainder of their claims must be dismissed. In

'See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (2003).
'Peeples v. State, 100 P.3d 254,256 (Utah Ct App. 2004).
'Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(ii) (2003).
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support of their argument, the defendants cite Yearsley v. Jensen J6 In Yearsley, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed a district court's decision not to grant leave to amend a complaint where
the plaintiff initially sought damages only for assault and battery but later sought to add a claim
for malicious prosecution and unlawful arrest.77 The Utah Supreme Court held: "By no stretch of
the facts can a claim for the physical beating be construed to include a claim for malicious
prosecution."78 The court also said that the plaintiffs "only demand for damages was for
physical and emotional distress arising from the physical beating. Not even an obscure reference
was made to any other misconduct."79 The court concluded its discussion by stating, "a notice of
assault and battery does not contemplate a malicious prosecution or a false arrest claim....
There must be enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so that the
defendant can appraise its potential liability."80
Far from supporting the defendants' position, Yearsley cuts against it. Nowhere in
Yearsley did the Utah Supreme Court require the plaintiff to list with exactitude the title of each
cause of action. Instead, the court spoke of construed allegations, obscure references, and
"enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim"*1 Indeed, the statute

798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).
7</. at 1129.
l

Id. (emphasis added).

}

Id. (emphasis added).

}

Id. (emphasis added).

{

Id
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itself requires only a description of the nature of the claim, not a specific, count-by-count listing
of each cause of action sufficient to withstand scrutiny in a code pleading jurisdiction.
After reviewing the Jensens' notice of claim, the court finds that it alleges facts from
which defendants easily could have anticipated each of the Jensens' state constitutional and tort
causes of action. And defendants admit that the infliction of emotional distress cause of action
satisfies the notice of claim requirements.82 Since the notice of claim complies with § 63-301 l(3)(a)(ii), defendants' first argument is without merit.
Defendants' second argument — that the notice of claim fails to allege the individual
defendants acted with fraud or malice83 — likewise fails. The defendants cite no Utah case
holding that a notice of claim must not only describe conduct that is malicious or fraudulent but
also must contain the specific words "malice" or "fraud." Utah courts define "actual malice" or
"legal malice" as "conduct that manifests a reckless disregard or indifference to the rights and
safety of others."84 The Jensens' notice of claim describes defendants' conduct in that fashion,
including repeated alleged instances of knowingly making false statements to Utah courts to
achieve their ends. This sufficiently alleges malice or fraud for purposes of the UGIA and
permits the Jensens' state claims to proceed.

-Docket No. 24, at 26.
'See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4)(a) (2003).
'Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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Utah Constitutional Violations

The defendants also argue that the Jensens' Utah constitutional claims must be dismissed
because the constitutional provisions allegedly violated are not self-executing. The court agrees
in part with defendants' arguments.
Damages are recoverable for violations of the Utah Constitution only if the provision
violated is self-executing, and then only when three elements from Spackman ex rel Spackman v.
Board of Education are met: (1) the plaintiff suffered a flagrant violation of constitutional rights;
(2) existing remedies do not redress the plaintiffs injuries; and (3) equitable relief was and is
wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiffs rights or redress the plaintiffs injuries.85 The Jensens
allege that defendants violated four provisions of the Utah Constitution: (1) Article I, § 1, dealing
with inherent and inalienable rights; (2) Article I, § 7, the Due Process Clause; (3) Article I, § 14,
dealing with unreasonable searches and seizures; and (4) Article I, § 25, which reserves
unenumerated rights to the people. For claims under these sections to be viable, the court must
first determine whether these provisions are self-executing. If they are, the court must then
decide whether the three-part test is satisfied.
a.

Are the Provisions Self Executing?

Under Utah law,
[a] constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule sufficient to
give effect to the underlying rights and duties intended by the framers. In other
words, courts may give effect to a provision without implementing legislation if
the framers intended the provision to have immediate effect and if 'no ancillary
legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a

'Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc, 16 P.3d 533, 537-39 (Utah 2000).
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duty imposed . . . . ' Conversely, constitutional provisions are not self-executing if
they merely indicate a general principle or line of policy without supplying the
means for putting them into effect.86
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that Article I, § 7 is self-executing,87 and
defendants here assume that Article I, § 14 is self-executing. The two contested provisions are
therefore §§1 and 25 of Article I. Based on the Spackman rule quoted above, the court holds
that Article I, § 1 is self-executing. This section states: "All men have the inherent and
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties;... and petition for redress of
grievances . . . ,"88 Utah citizens' ability to enjoy their "inherent and inalienable right to enjoy
and defend their lives and liberties" is not contingent upon implementing legislation.
In contrast, the court holds that Article I, § 25 is not self-executing. This provision states:
"This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the
people."89 Section 25 is very similar to the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
the court has already held cannot by itself provide the basis for a § 1983 claim. And § 25 is more
of a "general principle or line of policy without" that does not "supply[] the means for putting [it]
into effect.5'90 Accordingly, the Jensens' eighth cause of action (based on Article I, § 25) fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must be dismissed.

s

Id at 535 (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996)).

7

See id. at 536.

*Utah Const, art. I, § 1.
'Id. artL, §25.
^packman, 16 P.3d at 535 (quotation marks omitted).
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Are Money Damages Available for the Self-Executing Provisions?

Though §§ 1,7, and 14 of Article I are self-executing, the court must still determine
whether damages are appropriate for violations of these sections. The answer to this question
depends on whether the complaint's allegations establish these three elements from Spackman:
"[f]irst, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a 'flagrant' violation of his or her
constitutional rights"; "[s]econd, a plaintiff must establish that existing remedies do not redress
his or her injuries"; and "[t]hird, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief, such as an
injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiffs rights or redress his or her
•

•

5591

*

injuries.
Based on these factors, the court holds that, at this early stage of the litigation, it cannot
say with certainty that damages would be inappropriate. The alleged violations of these sections
appear to be "flagrant" and equitable relief was and is "wholly inadequate" to redress these
wrongs; Spackman's first and third elements are therefore satisfied. Spademan's second element,
however, is the difficult one. The Jensens spend considerable time discussing how their state
claims differ from their federal claims, but they spend little time demonstrating that existing
remedies, under § 1983 and other bodies of law, are inadequate to redress the injuries they
suffered. Likewise, the state refers only generally to § 1983 as providing sufficient

{

Id. at 538-39.
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compensation, not perhaps appreciating that whether the federal cause of action under § 1983
provides sufficient redress for a state constitutional claim is an open question in Utah.92
The court is well aware that it must "use [its] common law remedial power cautiously and
in favor of existing remedies."93 That determination, however, must be made with a precise
understanding of the nature of a plaintiff s injuries and the remedies available to address them.
The court can have only a general understanding of the plaintiffs injuries at this point in the
process, and therefore anyfirmdetermination of this issue is premature. Accordingly, the court
denies the motion to dismiss the Jensen's remaining state constitutional law claims, believing
that as this litigation progresses the remedies issue will come into clearer focus.
IV.

The Doctor Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The Jensens have asserted claims against Dr. Lars Wagner, Dr. David Corwin, Dr. Cheryl
Coffin, and Dr. Karen Albritton — doctors at Primary Children's Medical Center — for their role
in the events of 2003. These defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss. Where the doctor
defendants' and State employee defendants' arguments overlap, the court will refer to its earlier
discussion.
A.

Collateral Estoppel

The doctor defendants first argue that the Jensens are estopped from bringing their claims
because they were all addressed in the juvenile court proceedings. In their opening

92

See Spackman, 16 P.3d at 538 n.10 ("We do not reach the question of whether existing
federal law remedies should preclude a state court from awarding damages for a state
constitutional tort.").
93

Id. at 539.
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memorandum, the doctors invoked collateral estoppel as the relevant estoppel species. In the
doctors' reply memorandum, however, collateral estoppel had evolved into judicial estoppel.
A legal theory may not make its first appearance in a reply memorandum. "A reply
memorandum must be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum opposing the
motion . . . ,"94 And failure to raise an issue in an opening memorandum constitutes waiver of
that issue.95 So to the extent judicial estoppel differs from collateral estoppel, the court will
disregard those differences and base its ruling on collateral estoppel only — the issue defendants
raised in their opening memorandum.
Under Utah law, the four elements of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion are:
[1] [T]he party against who issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to
or in privy with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; [3] the
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and
[4] the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.96
Since the court at this stage of the proceedings must accept the complaint's allegations as
true, the court finds that juvenile court proceedings in 2003 do not collaterally estop the Jensens'
claims. Specifically, the second and third elements are not met. This case concerns whether
events before and during the juvenile court proceedings violated the Jensens' rights under the
Utah and United States Constitutions — issues the juvenile court did not consider. And the
94

DUCivR7-l(b)(3).

95

See King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1091 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1999); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994); Codner
v. United States, 17 F.3d 1331, 1332 (10th Cir. 1994).
96

Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 686 (Utah 2005)
(quotation marks omitted).
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Jensens' complaint is replete with allegations that the issues were not fairly litigated because of
fraud and deceit. These allegations, which the court must accept as true, prevent a finding that
the earlier proceedings were "fully[] and fairly litigated."97 The court therefore denies this
portion of the doctor defendants' motion to dismiss.
B.

The Jensens' § 1983 Claims
1.

Substantive Due Process

The doctors characterize the Jensens' complaint as asserting a "right to absolute parental
autonomy... to raise their child free from any state interference" and argue that the United
States Constitution does not protect such a right. The doctors mischaracterize the Jensens' claim.
The complaint does not, as the doctors assert, allege the right to be absolutely free from state
interference. Rather, it seeks to vindicate allegedly unconstitutional deprivations of the
Fourteenth Amendment interests identified earlier as the right to familial association and a
parent's right to direct the care and upbringing of children. As discussed in above, the
Constitution protects these rights, and the complaint's allegations are sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss.
2.

Substantive Due Process Violations Pleaded as to Each Doctor

The doctors next argue that the complaint fails to state a claim for substantive due process
violations against them because their alleged conduct does not "shock the conscience of federal
judges."98 Based on recent Tenth Circuit precedent, this standard does not apply in this case.

!

Docket No. 18 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1997)).
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In Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., a district court dismissed parents' substantive due process
claims (that were very similar to those the Jensens allege here) because the conduct alleged did
not "shock the conscience of the court."99 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that "the district
court misapprehended the legal standard applicable to purported substantive due process rights
that — like the right to consent to medical treatment for oneself and one's minor children — may
be 'objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"100 The circuit continued:
"While the 'shocks the conscience' standard applies to tortious conduct challenged under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it does not exhaust the category of protections under the Supreme
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, or eliminate more categorical protection for
'fundamental rights' as defined by the tradition and experience of the nation."101 Though the
circuit ultimately "decline[d] to resolve the difficult questions regarding the standard to be
applied to this claim because the district court gave only cursory treatment to the parents'
substantive due process claims," its discussion strongly indicates that the "shock the conscience"
standard does not govern the Jensens' claims.
Rather than applying the "shocks the conscience" standard here, the court takes its cue
from the Tenth Circuit's cite to Washington v. Glucksberg, which in turn cited Reno v. Flores for
the proposition that government conduct that infringes upon fundamental liberty interests (such

'336 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Or. 2003).
)0

Id at 1203 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).

n

Id. (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-51 (1998)).
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as the Jensens' claimed liberty interests here) is unconstitutional "'unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'"102 The court will apply this standard.
Before reaching the merits, the court acknowledges the seemingly inconsistent standards
mandated by Dubbs and Griffin. In Section III.D, the court responded to the State employee
defendants' motion to dismiss by applying Griffin, which mandates a "balancing test" and a hunt
for an "undue burden" when liberty interests such as familial association are at issue.103 Dubbs,
in contrast, points to the "narrowly tailored / compelling interest" test for substantive due process
rights (such as a parent's right to direct a child's medical care) that "may be 'objectively, deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"104 The right to enjoy familial association arguably
is as deeply rooted in this Nation's history as a parent's right to direct medical care. So on one
level, it makes little sense to assign different tests to these two rights based on labels like "liberty
interest" versus "substantive due process right" — particularly where the Tenth Circuit has
previously held that the familial right of association is in fact a subset of a substantive due
process right.105
One possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that Glucksberg's rule,
identified Dubbs, that "the Fourteenth Amendment 'forbids the government to infringe . . .
"fundamental" liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement

m

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).

m

Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993).

m

Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).

105

Gn#m, 983 F.2d at 1547.
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is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest"'106 supercedes the balancing test/undue
burden requirement from Griffin. Perhaps another explanation is that finding an "undue burden"
is equivalent to finding that no compelling state interest exists, or that the State's means were not
narrowly tailored. But this seems unlikely, particularly because the Supreme Court recently
applied the narrowly tailored/compelling state interest standard in a substantive due process
case107 despite the existence and applicability of the "undue burden" standard to other substantive
due process rights.108 If the two tests were identical, the continued distinction would be of no
use.
One certainty emerges from this tangled web of apparent substantive due process
inconsistencies: this court is not the proper entity to resolve this debate. The court is bound by
Tenth Circuit precedent. Both Dubbs and Griffin appear to be good law, so the court will apply
two different tests — the balancing test to the motion to dismiss the associational claims, and the
narrowly tailored/compelling state interest test to the motion to dismiss the substantive due
process claim for invasion of the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care.
As to the latter, the doctors claim that they did not infringe the Jensens' substantive due
process rights because they merely diagnosed P.J.'s condition and reported Mr. and Mrs. Jensen
to DCFS as Utah law required after the Jensens failed to enroll their son in chemotherapy. The
Jensens, in turn, accuse the doctors of violating the Jensens' substantive due process rights by,

106

107

521U.S.at721.

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003).

m

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-78 (1992).
-36-

Case 2:05-cv-00739-PGC

Document 52

Filed 06/16/2006

Page 37 of 47

among other things, misrepresenting P.J.'s condition to the juvenile court, refusing to order
specific medical tests that would have conclusively identified P.J.'s cancer, and ignoring or
misrepresenting evidence that was inconsistent with their diagnosis.
Since these arguments appear in a motion to dismiss, and since the Jensens have alleged
numerous misrepresentations, the court must hold that the Jensens' complaint adequately alleges
a substantive due process violation. There is no compelling state interest in falsifying or
misrepresenting evidence to a juvenile court. But it should go without saying that this holding
assumes the doctors actually did what plaintiffs allege; to survive summary judgment, the
Jensens must put forth evidence in support of their claims.
3.

P.J.'s Liberty Interests

In Section IH.C.l, the court held that, under the facts of this case, P.J. had no liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment. The court grants this portion of the doctors' motion to
dismiss for the same reasons discussed in that section.
4.

Procedural Due Process

Like the State employee defendants, the doctor defendants argue that the Jensens fail to
state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process. In particular, the doctors argue that the
most detailed allegations of procedural due process violations relate to the State defendants'
actions. They assert that the Jensens' failure to provide specific allegations as to each doctor is
fatal to this claim.
The trouble with this argument is that it ignores Tenth Circuit precedent. In Northington
v. Marin, the circuit discussed tort law principles of joint and several liability and then said,
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"[t]hese rules apply in § 1983 actions. Persons who concurrently violate others' civil rights are
jointly and severally liable for injuries that cannot be apportioned."109
Here, the complaint implicates all defendants — the State employees and the doctors —
in its allegations of constitutional deprivations. The injuries the Jensens assert as a result of the
alleged failure to conduct confirmatory tests and misrepresentations to the Utah court "cannot be
apportioned." This case seems to fit squarely within the rulefromNorthington; as such, the
court denies the doctors' motion to dismiss the procedural due process claim.
5.

Ninth Amendment

The doctors, like the State defendants, ask the court to dismiss the Jensens' Ninth
Amendment claim. The court grants this motion for the same reasons outlined in Section IH.G
above.
6.

Malicious Prosecution

The doctors next ask the court to dismiss the Jensens' § 1983 and state tort malicious
prosecution claims because the Jensens' pleas in abeyance preclude them from establishing the
"favorable termination" element of these causes of action. As noted above, it is too early in the
proceedings to determine with certainty whether the Jensens' plea agreement was procured by
unfair means. If so, this element may be satisfied. The court therefore DENIES this motion for
the same reasons discussed in Section III.F above.

102 F.3d 1564, 1569 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Absolute Immunity

The doctors claim they are entitled to absolute immunity for all the Jensens' cognizable
claims because they "were integral parts of the judicial process"110 — that is, their actions were
allegedly limited to those mandated by law (reporting their diagnosis, P.J.'s condition, and the
Jensens' decision to the State) and to participation in the juvenile court proceedings.111 The
doctors thus seek protection under Brisco v. LaHue's wide grant of "integral" immunity. The
court agrees in part with this assertion.
When deciding whether a defendant is absolutely immune from suit, this court must
"apply a 'functional approach . . . which looks to the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it.'"112 "'The more distant a function is from the judicial
process, the less likely absolute immunity will attach.'"113 For this reason, malicious prosecution
defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity if they were complaining witnesses — "the
person (or persons) who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff'114 —
whose "testimony [was] relevant to the manner in which" the plaintiffs prosecution was initiated
or perpetrated.115

m

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983).

ln

&>eDocketl8,at38.

U2

Malikv. Arapahoe CountyDep'tof Soc. Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1314(10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)).
m

Id. (quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687 (10th Cir. 1999)).

xu

Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1399 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992).

n5

Id. at 1401.
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In this case, the complaint alleges that Dr. Wagner's and Dr. Albritton's testimony
instigated or encouraged the Jensens' juvenile court case and was relevant to the manner in
which those proceedings occurred. The Jensens specifically allege that these doctors did not act
in good faith — they allege that Dr. Wagner refused to order tests that would have confirmed the
Ewing's sarcoma diagnosis, and that he threatened them by stating, "If you don't come in for
treatment, I will take your son." And they allege that Dr. Albritton made several factual
misrepresentations and omissions to the juvenile court during the courts of the proceedings. If
these facts are tine — as the court must assume on this motion to dismiss — these two doctors
are not entitled to absolute immunity.
On the other hand, Dr. Corwin and Dr. Coffin did not "initiate or perpetuate the
prosecution." Accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint as true, Dr. Corwin attempted to
mediate the dispute between the Jensens and PCMC, and Dr. Coffin diagnosed P.J.'s disease.
Dr. Corwin and Dr. Coffin are therefore entitled to absolute immunity.
E.

Qualified Immunity

The doctors invoke qualified immunity as a separate defense. Since the court has held
that Dr. Wagner and Dr. Albritton are not absolutely immune, it will examine whether these two
doctors are qualifiedly immune from suit.
As discussed in above, the qualified immunity test consists of two parts: first, do the facts
as alleged show the violation of a constitutional right? And second, was that right clearly
established?116 A right is clearly established when its contours are "sufficiently clear that a

n6

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
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reasonable official would know that what he is doing violates that right."117 If the answer to
either question is "no," the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
1.

Substantive Due Process

The doctors first claim they are qualifiedly immune from the Jensens' substantive due
process claims. They do not concede the first element but jump directly to the second and argue
that the Jensens' alleged constitutional rights were not clearly established.
Rather than skip the first inquiry, the court holds that the facts as alleged here violate the
Jensens' Fourteenth Amendment rights for the reasons discussed above. As to the second
element, these rights were clearly established in 2003. Defendants' arguments to the contrary are
misplaced because they focus solely on the Utah law that required them to report instances of
suspected abuse or neglect. But the report itself is not the issue. Whatever reporting
requirements Utah law imposed, the law obviously did not require them to threaten the Jensens,
refuse to perform confirmatory tests, or make false, incomplete, or misleading statements to Utah
courts, as the Jensens allege they did, with knowledge that these actions would curtail the
Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s care and harm their family. Whether this conduct actually occurred
is a vigorously disputed issue of fact to be determined later — the court must accept these
allegations as true at this early stage. And based on these allegations, qualified immunity is
inappropriate because the doctors' actions violated clearly established law.

J

Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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Procedural Due Process

The doctors also argue that they did not violate the Jensens' procedural rights by
diagnosing P.J., reporting potential neglect, and testifying in juvenile proceedings. Assuming
without deciding that the doctors' position is correct, they again misunderstand the nature of the
Jensens' claim, which goes to the fairness of those proceedings.118 The plaintiffs allege that Dr.
Wagner and Dr. Albritton made multiple factual misrepresentations during these events. Such
omission or falsehoods would undoubtedly affect the fairness of the proceedings. Based on these
alleged facts, qualified immunity is inappropriate.
F.

Violations of the Utah Constitution

The doctors next ask the court to dismiss the Jensens' Utah Constitution claims because
the provisions allegedly violated "do not substantially differ from their federal counterparts."119
Their argument is based on State v. Harris, where the Utah Supreme Court said, "[w]e
acknowledge that as a general rule, we will not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an
argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitution is briefed."120
Defendants' argument is misplaced for at least two reasons. First, the sentence in Harris
immediately following the one quoted above reads: "However, we apply this rule in cases where
a party relies nominally on state constitutional provisions while actually relying on the parallel

^See supra Section HIE; Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
'Docket No. 18, at 43.
'104 P.3d 1250, 1258 (Utah 2004) (brackets and quotation marks omitted).
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federal constitutional provisions and analysis based on them."121 When drafting their complaint,
the Jensens relied equally on the United States and Utah constitutions: four causes of action were
based on each. To this point, then, there has been no "nominal" reliance on the state constitution.
The second problem is related to the first. Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
their Utah counterparts require only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."122 At this early stage, it would be premature for the court to dismiss
the Jensens' state constitutional claims for lack of detailed briefing when the complaint satisfies
notice pleading requirements.
That said, the court's holding in response to the State defendants' motion to dismiss —
that Article I, § 25 is not self-executing — applies with equal force to the doctors. The court
therefore dismisses the Jensens' eighth cause of action as against the doctors.
G.

Utah Tort Claims

Finally, the doctors ask the court to dismiss the Jensens' tort causes of action. To the
extent their arguments overlap with the State defendants', the court denies their motion for the
same reasons already discussed.
The doctors also argue a few distinct points. First, they cite Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10
for the proposition that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not waive immunity for
causes of action arising out of "infliction of mental anguish." This language, which appears in
the subsection the doctors cite, must be read in context. The entire statute reads: "Immunity jfrom

m

Id. (brackets and quotation marks omitted).

122

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee except if the injury arises out o f . . . infliction of mental anguish."123
The Act defines a governmental entity as "the state and its political subdivisions as defined in
this chapter."124 Thus, by its plain language, the statute does not concern the liability (or
immunity) of individuals such as the doctors, but rather the political subdivisions of the state.
The doctors next argue that the Jensens fail to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress because they fail to plead that the doctors acted with the "purpose" of
inflicting emotional distress. Pleading a "purpose" of inflicting emotional distress is one option
for establishing the first element of this cause of action, but a plaintiff may also state a claim by
alleging the defendant "acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood ofcausing[] emotional
distress."125 The Jensens' complaint sufficiently alleges "reckless disregard" to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. And it also adequately alleges the second prong, "outrageous and intolerable"
conduct.126 "It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery."127 The court
finds that facts alleged in the complaint satisfy this standard.

123

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3) (2003).

m

Id. § 63-30-2(3) (2003).

l25

Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 535 (Utah 2002) (emphasis added).

m

Schuurman v. Shingleton, 26 P.3d 227, 233 (Utah 2001).

121

Id. (brackets and quotation marks omitted).
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Motion to Certify

The final motion before the court is the Jensens' motion to certify the following question
to the Utah Supreme Court:
Have plaintiffs' Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action adequately
alleged a claim under the Utah state constitution within the meaning of Spackman
v. Board ofEducation, 2000 UT 87,16 P.3d 533 (2000)?128
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides the mechanism by which this
court may certify a question of law to the Utah Supreme Court. The rule requires this court to
submit a certification order to the Utah Supreme Court that states: (1) the question of law to be
answered; (2) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in this proceeding; and (3)
that there appears to be no controlling Utah law.129
This court may certify a question of law to the Utah Supreme Court, but it need not do so
each time "there is doubt as to local law."130 As the Supreme Court has stated:
In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant
its non-exercise, it has from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal
courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law
whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment.131

128

Pls.' Mot. to Certify Question of Law to Utah Supreme Court (Docket No. 32), at 2,
Jensen v. Utah, Case No. 2:05-CV-00739 PGC (D. Utah filed Jan. 9,2006).
129

UtahR.App.P.41(c).

m

Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974).

m

Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
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And the Tenth Circuit has emphasized the Supreme Court's teaching that '"[n]ovel, unsettled
questions of state law, however, not "unique circumstances," are necessary before federal courts
may avail themselves of state certification procedures.'"132
The Jensens' motion comes very early in these proceedings. At this early point, the court
cannot conclude that the question they want certified presents a controlling issue of Utah law —
Rule 41(c)'s second element. And it is unclear whether Rule 41(c)'s third element, an absence of
controlling Utah law, is met. The court therefore denies the Jensens' motion to certify.
CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS the State of Utah's motion to dismiss (# 25) and DISMISSES the
State as a defendant. All claims against it fail because of sovereign immunity.
The court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the State employees' and doctors'
motions to dismiss (# 17, # 23). The Jensens' fourth cause of action (based on the Ninth
Amendment) and eighth cause of action (based on Article I, § 25 of the Utah Constitution) fail to
state claims upon which relief may be granted. The court thus GRANTS defendants' motion and
DISMISSES these two claims against all defendants. The court also GRANTS defendant
Richard Anderson's motion to dismiss all claims against him in his official capacity for this same
reasons it dismisses the claims against the State of Utah. The court GRANTS defendants'
motion to dismiss P.J.'s malicious prosecution claim against all defendants because he fails to
allege that he was prosecuted. And the court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss P.J.'s first

l32

Copier ex rel Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997)).
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cause of action because, under the facts of this case, he had no liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment. The court also holds that Dr. Corwin and Dr. Coffin are entitled to absolute
immunity; the court therefore GRANTS their motion and DISMISSES all claims against them.
The court DENIES the defendants' motions in all other respects.
Finally, the court DENIES the Jensens' motion to certify (# 32) at this early stage of the
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

Paul G. Cassell
United States District Judge
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memorandum.

I--I looked at--

THE COURT:

Well, I wonder--Mr. Morse, I wonder if

you can tell me, is there--is there an ability here to sort of
make an overview as to--as to why this is a res judicata?
What's--I mean, this is a transfer, if that's the correct
phrase, from the Federal Court to this Court.
MR. MORSE:

Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. MORSE:

I, frankly, don't know what the

difference would be between res judicata and law of the case.
They both bar the plaintiffs' claims here.
The plaintiffs have pointed out, and I think
technically correctly, that res judicata, technically, may not
apply within the same case.

What they failed to tell you in

that same case of Kerr McGee is that law--law of the case does
bar their claims.

It's the same rule.

You have one bite at

the apple and trial judges are not permitted to second-guess
what another trial judge does within the same case.
You would be no more able to second-guess Judge
Dever than you would Judge Stewart, even though Stewart is in
a different Fed--a different court system.
The--the--if the plaintiffs do not like what
happened at the trial court in--across the street in Federal
Court, they're free to file an appeal, which is what they've
done.
T

seriously.
A t 3no time <lid he say yes, we accept it as true, we,

you know, take that as a higher authority than a different
institution, there is no evidence whatsoever that that would-that that allegation .is true.
THE COURT:
there.

Ms. Vanorman, I'm going to stop you

Your 1time has expired.
MS. VANORMAN:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I think I understand your appreciate.

MS. VANORMAN:
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Appreciate your argument.

Thank you.

Ms. Porter?
MS. PORTER:
THE COURT:
MS. PORTER:
THE COURT:
MS. PORTER:
THE COURT:
MS, PORTER:

Thank you, your Honor.

1

For the plaintiff.
Pardon?
For the plaintiff.
Yes.
Plaintiffs.
Your Honor, it is obvious from both the 1

briefing and 1Erom the argument that we've heard today that the
defendants place most of their eggs in a res judicata basket.
The problem is, res judicata does not apply unless
there are two separate cases.

1

It's pretty obvious, when you

look at all of our case law, that's just not an argument that
they have available to them.
37

The--so, what happens then is, recognizing that we
were correct on that, two arguments were made in reply memos;
one was, well, okay, issue preclusion anyway, can't we still
argue that?

And citing the Oman case.

No, actually, if you

look at the Oman case, that case involved two subsequent
cases.
And there's a reason for that, your Honor, you know
it's a well-established principle of res judicata that any
claims that, whether they were made or could have been made,
you know, once the case is over, then those cas--those claims
are precluded.

So, thatfs why there's the two-case

requirement for that.
And that--and the defendants have--some have
conceded, some have just simply not cited any authority to the
contrary that we're right, res judicata not available here.
So, what happens is, in the reply memo, for the
first time, first time the words have ever been uttered by any
of the defendants is in the reply memo.

And they say, well,

you know, okay, maybe res judicata doesn't really apply here
but we--we should have argued law of the case.
It was kind of interesting because of the defense
counsel said, we didn't attempt--the plaintiffs did not
attempt to argue any of the exceptions to the law of the case
doctrine, so we were basically agreeing with them.
we?

How would

The first time we even saw it or had any inkling that

18

1

they were going to argue this was Friday afternoon in their

2

reply memorandum.

3

So, there are some--several problems with this

4

attempt and I'm going to explain how we have severely

5

prejudiced if they are allowed to even argue law of the case.

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. PORTER: Sure.

8

THE COURT:

9
10

ask this.

Let me ask this--

I donft mean to interrupt, but let me

To what extent, in your view, do I handle Judge

Stewartfs decision?

11

MS. PORTER: We--we--

12

THE COURT:

How should I--what do I do with it?

13

MS. PORTER:

Basically you can read it and find

14

whatever informational value you think it might have or

15

something, but it is not binding, it's not controlling.

16

you don't agree with it, you can and we believe, should, do

17

your own independent evaluation of the record that has been

18

provided to you and then apply that to the State Constitution.

19

If

And in a few minute--in a couple of minutes, I'm

20

going to give you the very authority to do that, with an only

21

two-week-old Court of Appeals case and it's not cited because

22

again, the first time they even suggested law of the case was

23

just Friday afternoon.

24
25

I do want to clarify one thing.

I believe there was

a statement made that law of the case only applied if there's
_

no final--been no final ruling, et cetera; but I think that
was a misstatement or a misspeaking, perhaps.

Actually, one

of the most common uses of the law of the case, which I know
from painful experience 15 years ago, is actually after
there's been a final order, it's gone up on appeal, goes back
on some other issue and the Court--and the Appellate Courts
typically use law of the case to say, now, you know, to the
trial court, whatever issues you're going to decide here,
don't be re-looking at any of the ones that have already been
resolved.

So, it is actually most commonly used with respect

to--to whether it's final or not final.
THE COURT:

May I ask you, what is the difference

between law of the case and res judicata?
MS. PORTER:
THE COURT:
MS. PORTER:

Principally-If any?
Well, there's--there's several

principal differences and actually I'm going to get into some
of those.

There are different elements, there are different

defenses available to a claim of res judicata versus law of
the case.

It--the most obvious difference is that res

judicata only applies when there are two separate cases. Law
of the case only applies when there's a single case; but if-if I may, and if you feel in a minute that I haven't given you
more detail on some of these differences, but I think you'll
see in just a second what some of the very specific
40

differences are, because this is why we are severely
prejudiced if they are allowed to make an argument, an
untimely argument on law of the case.
And I don't think I have to point that I--that the
Utah Supreme Court has held numerous times that an argument
raised for the first time in a reply memorandum is not proper
and--and shouldn't be considered and is unfair to the opposing
party.
The defendants here, at least one of the defendants,
said, well, one of the cases that you cite actually had some
discussion about law of the case in it, as a--as a different
issue.

I would be surprised if that wasn't true of every

single case that any party cited that has more than one issue
that's been addressed, but they--they didn't cite it, it's
not--it wasn't cited for law of the case principles.

What

they're basically arguing is that we should have read all of
the cases and sifted through and found and said, well, here's
an argument that maybe they should have made, so let's go
ahead and respond to it.
They, you know, we don't question other people's
strategy and what arguments they choose to make.

There may be

reasons they thought they could argue res judicata, because
for one thing, res judicata, according to them, you have n o no discretion.
judicata.

You're just--your hands are tied under res

Quite--it's quite the opposite with law of the
41

case.

So,

that well be a strategic decision that they made.
But some of the--the prejudice that we have here

relates to these differences between these concepts.

First of

all, we've had no chance to brief it and it's too late now.
The--the reference to the possibility of supplemental
briefing, you know, one reason we have this sort of expedited
briefing hearing schedule was so that the--to allow the--the
rest of the discovery to be completed and trial to--to occur,
because we raised the concern that it's now three-and-a-half
years since the lawsuit was filed and we haven't been able to
get to trial yet.
So, no, you know, they chose, they were allowed to
choose the scope of their motions and they did; but we also
would have done--approached our own briefing differently had
they argued law of the case.

For example, they have re--

attempted to re-hash several purely legal rulings that already
were ruled on by Judge Cassell and were uninterrupted or
hadn't--were not addressed or modified by Judge Stewart.
So, for example, you know that 20 pages that we
spent talking about, how Brigham Young was arrested and you
know, the framers and all of that information, all of that was
run past Judge Cassell earlier, because they made the same
argument that we had supposedly not shown how the State
Constitutional protections were broader.

We did all that with

Judge Cassell, he ruled, yes, they are, on three of them.
42

There was a fourth one that he dismissed, but it--you know,
had--had they argued law of the case, we would have said
great, that just saved us 20 pages of arguing the history of
the State Constitution.
Same thing on Spackman.

They made the same argument

to Judge Cassell that were unmodified by Judge Stewart--I
mean, pardon me.

They made the same argument to Judge Cassell

who made legal rulings about the law itself that Judge Stewart
did not modify or disagree with, with relation to Spackman.
We wouldn't have had to brief all that because we could have
said, well, if we're going to argue law of the case, here's
some nice ones that help us quite a bit.
You know, Judge Cassell specifically ruled that the-that--in this particular case, equitable relief would not be
adequate.

But here, we're having to brief it again.

You

know, he made specific, and when he did cite his--for one--for
a different point, we cited his opinion but we didn't even
provide the Court a copy of it because they weren't arguing
law of the case.
Same thing with the effect of the Jensens' plea in
abeyance.

Judge Cassell ruled as a matter of law that--that

such a plea in abeyance does not bar these types of claims
because you're--you1re entitled to argue coercion, the
improper stacking, you know, the--the arguments we made at--if
one claim has probable cause and the other doesn't, it's not a
43

full bar.
All those arguments were raised with Judge Cassell,
he ruled on the legal issues, but we were forced to brief them
again because the defendants brought them up again. So,
again, had they taken a different approach, we would have
taken a different approach.
Also, law of the case, one of the defenses, so to
speak, or the responses that a party can do with respect to
law of the case is, a party is totally allowed to argue that
the prior ruling is erroneous.

Now, remember, they say under

res judicata, you1re just stuck with it; but it is an actual,
express argument that a party's entitled to make when it's law
of the case.

We could have taken that 35 or 40 pages of

issues that Cassell had already ruled on where the law was
already--of the case was already established, and we could
have gone through and focused on convincing you that Judge
Stewart's ruling was erroneous.

You know, we've made some

references to it, but we had to--we had, you know, the same
space constraints that everyone does.
But--so that is another serious way, because
remember, they say--and I think they're probably right--that
arguing that the ruling is erroneous is not something that you
typically are able to argue with res judicata.
Second--or we also would have been able to point out
the different standards that apply to law of the case. And
44

here's an example.

This--I did have time to just run law of

the case and pulled up the most recent case on law of the
case.

It is two weeks old, obviously, it's not cited under

the circumstances.

It's called State vs. Ruiz, R-u-i-z, it

was issued by the Court of Appeals on December 26th and the
cite of it is 2008 Utah Appellate 470.
your Honor, is 2008 West Law 5376549.

The West Law cite,
There is no P.3rd cite

yet.
In that case, this--this Court of Appeals case
actually completes negates what Mr. Morse postulated, which
was that you would be--you're no more free to reconsider Judge
Stewart's rulings than you would be to reconsider Judge--and I
can't remember who he picked, I'll just say Hilder, or--or,
you know, somebody--somebody else's rulings.
Well, actually, this case does the opposite.

In

this case, Judge Skanchy took over when Judge Fuchs retired,
took over a case, there had already been a specific ruling by
Judge Fuchs.

Judge Skanchy did not agree with the ruling and

so he opened it up again and ruled the opposite.
The defendant--this was a criminal case--the
defendant said, hey, law of the case here. And the Court of
Appeals said, you know, no, a judge can re-consider these
rulings at any time.
The--in Paragraph 10 of this opinion, the Court said
the law of the case doctrine is essentially a matter of
45

1

judicial economy rather than jurisdiction.

2

And then a little further down after the citation, a

3

judge can change his or her mind any time up until the entry

4

of final judgment, which is true, even if the judge has taken

5

over the case from another judge as a trial court is not

6

inexorably bound by its own precedent.

7

And there's been no final judgment in this case.

8

there's been no final judgment on the State Constitutional

9

claims.

If you disagree with all or part of Judge Stewart's

10

ruling, we think it's not only your option, but your

11

obligation to--to say so and to do what you believe is correct

12

under the Utah State law.

13

You know--you know what's ironic about the

14

defendants' argument is that they say--I mean, Judge Stewart

15

made a statement.

He didn't just say, I'm dismissing for lack

16 I of jurisdiction under 13-67.

He made an affirmative statement

17

that he was not deciding the State issues, he was remanding

18

them to State Court because they were important Constitutional

19

issues that should be determined by the State Court.

20

And yet the defendants are saying, but at the same

21

time, he tied you hands and said, oh, by the way, I've already

22

made the ruling for you.

23

with what Judge Stewart apparently contemplated, at least

24

judging by that particular statement.

25

THE COURT:

Their oral argument doesn't comport

May I ask this?
4F"

MS. PORTER:
THE COURT:

Yes.
In terms of the distinction that might

be made between any of the defendants, is there any?

In terms

of the--the motions that have been made-MS. PORTER:
THE COURT:
MS. PORTER:

Well---is there any distinction to be made?
--on--arguably one, two sets of

defendants basically decided to hitch their whole wagon
essentially to res judicata, at least two of them.

I think

Eisenman did, too, because her fact statement, all it did was
refer back to the exhibits from Federal Court, did not provide
any record to you in the State Court.

So, Wagner and Alberton

basically--in fact, that's all they did for their fact
statement, as we pointed out.

They have based it all on res

judicata.
Anderson basically did the same thing, although
they--they're trying to make an argument now, but again, not
even providing you with a record, but simply saying, you know,
here, you can just have what--you know, look at what Judge
Stewart did.
I think the same thing is true of Eisenman, because
all they did, they did not provide you with a separate State
record, all they did was say, see, Wag--the doctors' exhibits,
the only exhibits that they had that I believe that they were
referring to were with respect to the Federal claim.

I can't47

